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Companies listed on the Irish stock exchange have complicated accounting 
requirements and procedures compared to the smaller private companies in Ireland. 
Many smaller audit firms cannot provide this type of work and therefore there is the 
perception that listed companies can only look to the Big Four.  This then begs the 
question; ‘Do listed companies have a choice of auditor?’   
 
Presently there is a lot of interest in the area of competition and choice in the audit 
market.  In 2006 the UK’s Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and the Financial 
Reporting Council (FRC) commissioned a report to Oxera into ‘Competition and 
choice in the UK audit market’.  Previously in 2003 the General Accounting Office 
(GAO) in the USA made two reports to the US Senate on competition in the audit 
market in the USA.  Since the collapse of the last big firm Arthur Anderson in 2002, 
there is much concern about what would happen if the present Big Four were to 
become the Big Three.   
 
The researcher did an extensive literature search on the area of choice in the audit 
market and then sent questionnaires to the Chief Financial Officer of every company 
listed on the Irish Stock Exchange.  The researcher also interviewed a partner from a 
mid-tier firm to discover their views and opinion on the topic.   
 
It was found that more than 50 percent of respondents felt that there was currently 
enough choice in the audit market; however, the literature and the interviewee 
disagreed.  Many respondents would not consider the mid-tier firms as their auditor 
and many mid-tier firms were not well known to the respondents.  
 
In conclusion it would seem that perception and reputation have a great deal of 
influence over the choice of auditor.  Therefore if changes were made in the audit 
market to make information more freely available about the mid-tier firms’ 
capabilities, perhaps there would be more choice in the market that currently people 
just do not know about.  The competition authorities in this country and others would 
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Companies listed on the Irish Stock Exchange have complicated accounting 
requirements and procedures compared to the smaller private companies in Ireland. 
Listed companies require experts in their industries that know their financial needs.  
Many smaller audit firms cannot provide this type of work and therefore there is the 
perception that listed companies can only look to the Big Four to have an audit and 
this is examined in more depth in the dissertation.  The Big Four audit firms in Ireland 
are Deloitte and Touche, Ernst and Young, KPMG and PriceWaterhouseCoopers.  As 
listed companies are on such a vast scale sometimes it is only the Big Four that have 
the resources to conduct the audit.  This then begs the question, ‘Do listed companies 
have a choice of auditor?’  Choice is further restricted by independence rules, as an 
audit firm that carries out certain non-audit services on a client may not conduct the 
audit as well. 
 
1.2 Research aims and objectives 
This dissertation aims to address the following issues: 
1. How has the audit market evolved in the past 20 years? 
2. Do listed companies have a choice when selecting an auditor? 
3. What is the future of choice in the audit market? 
 
The research objectives are to: 
1. Find the causes of audit market concentration. 
2. Discover the impact of audit market concentration on the market. 
3. Determine the main criteria in selecting an auditor.  
4. State the barriers to entry to the audit market of listed companies by non Big 
Four firms. 
5. Describe the alternatives to an audit from the Big Four. 
6. Investigate recommendations to increase competition in the audit market. 
7. Investigate what would happen if one of the Big Four were to disappear. 
These aims and research objectives are discussed in more detail in chapter three. 
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1.3 Rationale for the research and limitations to the research  
The nature of competition in the audit market has been a subject of interest since the 
late 1970’s (Kwon, 1996).  Presently there is a lot of interest in the area of choice in 
the audit market as there are now only four global audit firms.  In 2006 the UK’s 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) 
commissioned a report by Oxera into ‘Competition and choice in the UK audit 
market’.  Similarly, in 2003 the General Accounting Office (GAO) in the USA made 
two reports to the US Senate on competition in the audit market.  
 
However, there has been no specific research into audit choice in Ireland.  Research 
into this area is important because it should state what the barriers to entry are for 
smaller firms and give some insight into possible solutions to provide more choice.  
Many large listed companies in the UK reported an effective choice of only two or 
three audit firms and in a small number of cases, companies may have no effective 
choice of auditor at all in the short term (Hambly, 2006).  The fact that listed 
companies have no effective choice of auditor at all is very alarming and if the market 
were to reduce to only a Big Three, what then would some of these companies do?  
The government and the competition authority in Ireland and possibly some other 
countries need to look at this issue before it becomes a reality, as the availability of a 
strong audit profession is a core component in Ireland’s recent economic success 
(O’Halloran, 2007). 
 
According to Koehler (2006) the gap separating the Big Four and the vast majority of 
audit service providers is enormous.  The auditing sector is marked by a stark contrast 
between four global firms accounting for the bulk of industry revenue while small 
firms account for the bulk of industry numbers.  Koehler (2006) also notes that 
authorities are looking for ways to improve the audit market structure and entry 
conditions. 
 
This research could be used by the mid-tier audit firms in order to design strategies 
that surpass the barriers to entry in the audit market.  Hopefully this research will give 




The audit committees of listed companies could also use this research.  Audit 
committees need to know that there are alternatives to the Big Four and that they are 
viable.  At present there is an information gap about the services the mid-tier firms 
can offer and what services the audit committees think the mid-tier firms can offer 
(Interviewee 1; GAO, 2003a; London Economic, 2006; Oxera, 2006).  However, mid-
tier firms will not be a direct alternative for all listed companies due to their business 
type. 
 
The potential use of this research will have limits, as there are some things about the 
audit market that cannot change or will take a long period of time to change.  The 
limitations to the research were access to information, time and money.  The postal 
survey’s main limitation was that it does not allow the researcher to seek further 
explanation on some points that the respondent may wish to state.  The researcher 
only had two months to conduct the primary research so there was limited time for 
collecting the data.   
 
The researcher had only the time to interview one partner; it would have been better if 
the researcher could have interviewed all the top 20 firms in Ireland as in Appendix F.  
Another major limitation with interview findings was the researcher’s bias, however 
to prevent this happening too much the interview was tape-recorded and the transcript 
typed soon after. 
 
1.4 Chapter outline 
The literature for the choice of audit firms for large companies listed was critically 
reviewed in chapter two.  The research methodology is outlined in detail in chapter 
three and the findings and analysis of the semi-structured interview and 
questionnaires are described in chapter four.  Finally, the conclusions and 








 Literature Review  
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter considers previously written literature on the nature of choice in the audit 
market for large companies. 
 
2.2 Audits of listed companies  
As a company becomes larger, more complex, more international, so too does their 
audit requirements change. The audits of large public companies are materially 
different to that of smaller companies, and at present the Big Four are only considered 
by audit committee chairs (Oxera, 2006).  This view is backed by UK mid-tier audit 
firms Grant Thornton and BDO Stoy Hayward, who recognize that the largest 
companies require such specialist technical skills that they currently need Big Four 
auditors (Perrin, 2006a). 
 
2.2.1 United States of America  
After the Enron and Arthur Anderson failures and the changes in the auditing 
environment from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the USA, the Big Four partners claim to 
be more conservative regarding client retention and acceptance decisions.  This 
generally means that the Big Four have become more aggressive in shedding smaller 
audit clients (Rama and Read, 2006).  These changes have also prompted concerns 
about concentration of the largest accountancy firms and the possible effect on 
competition (GAO, 2003a).  GAO (2003b) found that the majority of respondents to 
their survey were satisfied with their current auditor and that the longer a client had 
the same auditor the happier they were.  Many respondents to the GAO (2003b) 
survey were concerned at the level of choice especially when 88 percent said that they 
would not use the services of non Big Four auditors instead. 
 
2.2.2 United Kingdom 
The Coordinating Group on Audit and Accounting (CGAA, 2003a) agree with the 
Office of Fair Trading’s (OFT, 2004) conclusions that the market for auditing and 
accounting is highly concentrated and they welcomed the OFT’s commitment to keep 
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the market under review.  An Audit Quality Forum report published in July 2005 
called for research on competition and barriers to choice in the audit market in the UK 
(AQF, 2005c).  Then the DTI and FRC commissioned a study in September 2005 on 
‘Competition and choice in the UK audit market’ by Oxera.  Oxera (2006) found that 
the Big Four audit firms audit all but one of the FTSE 100 companies, and represent 
99 percent of audit fees in the FTSE 350.   
 
2.2.3 Ireland 
Carr (2006a) concludes that the risks identified by Oxera (2006) apply equally in 
Ireland.  These include limited choice, increased potential for conflict of interest and a 
possible threat to the integrity of the system if the profession was to encounter another 
shock like that of the Arthur Anderson failure.  The failure of one of the Big Four 
would have a very significant and detrimental impact on the attractiveness of Ireland 
as a commercial market place (Wilson, 2007).  Grant Thornton (2007) agrees with the 
Minister of State for Trade and Commerce when he warned that the lack of choice 
could badly affect the wider corporate sector in Ireland.  The Minister said that: 
 
‘Ireland’s successful inward investment thrust and thriving financial services 
sectors have not, and cannot, survive without a competitive auditing services 
infrastructure’.   
 
Carr (2006a) thinks that non Big Four auditors need to differentiate themselves by 
specializing in sectors where they have the required skills.  This was evidenced by the 
growth of Grant Thornton in Ireland, which was driven by the firm’s strategy of 
developing its expertise in specialist services.  Raleigh (Managing partner of Grant 
Thornton) states that they are now providing these services to former Big Four clients 
(Kennedy, 2007a).  PKF Ryan Glennon another mid-tier firm in Ireland has a niche in 
the entertainment industry (McGinley, 2006).  This supports the mid-tier firms’ 
claims that they have swept up business in specialist service areas where the Big Four 
may face conflicts of interest. 
 
Auditors of Irish companies are prohibited by law from incorporating and are required 
by law to have unlimited liability in relation to audit work.  O’Halloran (2007) writes 
that this regime strongly prevents competition in the sector and exposes our public 
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companies and our funds in industry to associated risk.  The audit market will become 
more competitive by creating a sensible and realistic liability regime, which will make 
it attractive to those mid-tier firms who believe they can compete with the Big Four 
already if the risks were lower (Wilson, 2007). 
 
Another significant development is the 8th EU Directive, which requires recognition 
of statutory auditors from one Member State by other Member States.  The ability of 
these audit firms to audit in Ireland while being subject to a very different liability 
regime in their home State is unfair to Irish audit firms and is not a sustainable 
position (Wilson, 2007).  Therefore the recent announcement by Minister Michael 
Ahern regarding the Company Law Review Group (CLRG) to consider law in Ireland 
relating to auditor liability was seen as a welcome and timely move by many (Lambe, 
2007).  Aidan Connaughton (Head of Risk Management in Grant Thornton) also 
welcomed this decision stating that the auditing profession in Ireland is the only 
profession that cannot limit its liability under domestic law.  This, in addition to the 
legal principle of joint and several liability, leaves auditors potentially accountable on 
a personal basis for losses not just arising from their own actions but also that of 
others, for example, company directors who may be significantly responsible but who 
do not have the resources to meet claims against them (O’Connor, 2007).  
 
A recent report by Grant Thornton found that 96 percent of Irish companies are 
audited by the Big Four (Shoesmith, 2007). 
 
2.3 Causes of audit market concentration  
In the early eighties there were the Big Eight firms, namely: Klynreld Main 
Goerdeler; Deloitte, Haskins and Sells; Touche Ross; Ernst & Whinney; Arthur 
Young; Price Waterhouse; Coopers and Lybrand; and Arthur Anderson (Beattie et al, 
2003; GAO, 2003a). 
 
In 1987 Klynreld Main Goerdeler merged with Peat Markick to become KPMG Peat 
Marwick (now known as just KPMG); in 1989 Ernst & Whinney merged with Arthur 
Young to form Ernst & Young; Deloitte, Haskins and Sells merged with Touche Ross 
to become Deloitte & Touche.  This now left the market with the Big Six (Beattie et 
al, 2003; GAO, 2003a).  Then Price Waterhouse merged with Coopers and Lybrand in 
 7 
1998 to form PricewaterhouseCoopers (Beattie et al, 2003; GAO, 2003a).  Finally, in 
2002 Arthur Anderson collapsed after a reputation loss suffered from the accounting 
and auditing scandals associated with Enron, to leave the Big Four (Beattie et al, 
2003).   
 
2.4 Impact of concentration on the market 
McMeeking (2007) and Oxera (2006) found that price competition is significant at the 
initial tendering stage but audit fees have increased as a result of increasing 
concentration levels.  However, Evans (2006) states that the Oxera (2006) analysis is 
deeply misleading as the justification for the above evidence lies in an econometric 
study that demonstrates correlation and not causation.  Menon and Williams (2001) 
disagree because they found that audit firm mergers had no long-term effect on audit 
fees.  Other researchers such as Iyer and Iyer, 1996; Tai and Kwong, 1997; 
Ivancevich and Zardkoohi, 2000; Firth and Lau, 2004; McMeeking et al, 2006 (all 
cited by McMeeking, 2007) have addressed the pricing issue by comparing audit fees 
before and after the mergers, but their results were mixed. 
 
Oxera (2006) writes in their findings that the Big Four do seem to charge higher audit 
fees than the mid-tier firms.  The fees were found to be 18 percent higher for clients 
using the Big Four.  A reason for this Big Four ‘premium’ is that companies would be 
less likely to sue smaller audit firms given their ‘smaller pockets’, and this then makes 
it viable for smaller auditors to accept riskier clients.  This legal liability threat drives 
the Big Four to charge higher fees as an ‘insurance premium’ for future legal 
proceedings (Gonthier-Besacier and Schatt, 2007; Raghunandan and Rama, 1999).  
But, this pricing issue does not seem to be a problem as in general audit committee 
chairs focus more on quality than on price. Oxera (2006) points out that the changes 
in regulations are part of the increase in costs of audits as well. 
 
Ivancevich and Zardkoohi (2000), Pearson and Trompter (1994) and Tonge and 
Wooton (1991) all conclude that mergers between big audit firms produced more 
competition for companies.  They argue that even though there would be fewer 
competitors, competition would be increased and stimulated because the remaining 
firms would have more comparable resources, therefore the mergers were pro-
competitive from their findings.  However, Beattie et al (2003) argues that the 
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reduction in the number of active audit firms in the audit market did reduce consumer 
choice and increased the likelihood of conflicts of interest. This view was already 
pointed out years earlier when Kwon (1996) suggests that as a company’s industry 
becomes more concentrated, companies will seek to use audit firms different from 
that of their competitors.  An example of this is in the banking industry where there 
are four major banks in Ireland – Allied Irish Bank are audited by KPMG, Bank of 
Ireland are audited by PricewaterhouseCoopers, Ulster Bank (under parent of Royal 
Bank of Scotland) are audited by Deloitte and Touche and National Irish Bank (under 
parent Danske Bank Group) are audited by KPMG and Grant Thornton as a joint audit 
under Danish law.   
 
The Big Four have a virtual monopoly in auditing the large company sector in nearly 
every country (Koehler, 2006).   Oxera (2006) found that a limited number of UK 
listed companies have no effective choice of auditor in the short term.  This is due to 
high market concentration, auditor independence rules, supply side constraints, and 
the need for sector expertise.  Over one third of the FTSE 350 audit committee chairs 
surveyed feel that their company does not have a sufficient choice of auditor.  This 
point is further reiterated by Cunningham (2005) who writes that many companies 
have no choice but to choose a large firm. 
 
Oxera (2006) found that many large companies are worried about the combination of 
increased competition and tighter auditor independence regulations, which have 
reduced competitive pressure in the market.  However, the OFT (2002) conducted a 
preliminary inquiry into whether there are competition problems in this sector.  They 
did not find any evidence to suggest that the firms have acted to prevent, restrict or 
distort competition.  So at that time they concluded that they would not launch an 
investigation into the market or refer it to the Competition Commission.  The GAO 
(2003a) also found no evidence to suggest that competition has been impaired in the 
audit market to date in the USA. 
 
It is ironic that those companies whom most need an auditor are finding it difficult to 
recruit an auditor.  Oxera’s (2006) interviewees noted that the largest companies, who 
have the most bearing on investor confidence, are those with fewest alternatives to 
their current auditor. 
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2.5 Auditor selection criteria 
The most important determinants of choice are reputation, sector specific skills, 
international coverage, and quality of staff (Oxera, 2006). 
 
Harwood (senior audit partner at Baker Tilly) believes that part of the problem for 
audit choice is that the switching rates are low for auditors (Perrin, 2006a).  This point 
is further evidenced by Oxera (2006) as they found that no FTSE 100 or 250 
companies have ever switched from a Big Four firm to a mid-tier firm in their 10 year 
dataset.  Ghosh and Lustgarten (2006) also conclude that clients of the Big Four 
switch less often than other companies who have non Big Four auditors. 
 
2.6 Barriers to entry for non Big Four firms 
GAO (2003a), London Economic (2006) and Oxera (2006) found that a substantial 
entry by non Big Four firms is unlikely because of high costs of entry, a long payback 
period for investment, and barriers to entry.  These barriers include: perception bias, 
reputation, capacity and breadth of their networks, exposure to unlimited liability, 
very limited professional insurance availability, lack of staff, industry and technical 
expertise, capital formation, independence issues and global reach.   
 
The OFT (2001) and Oxera (2006) found that large companies prefer to use the Big 
Four because they think that their investors feel more comfortable if the accounts are 
audited by a firm with a known reputation.  This was backed up by Pittman and Fortin 
(2004) whose evidence suggest that choosing a Big Four auditor can reduce debt 
monitoring costs by enhancing the credibility of the financial statements.   
 
Oxera (2006) discovered that reputation is an important driver of choice, whether 
based on real or perceived differences with the mid-tier firms.  In the perception of 
most FTSE 350 companies, the Big Four are better placed to offer the components of 
the audit service.  This barrier is also pointed out by McMeeking et al (2006) who 
believe that an advantage exists for the Big Four because their reputation and depth of 
resources put them in a strong position to mitigate the agency and costly contracting 
costs that are becoming more significant for large companies. 
 
 10 
GAO (2003a) found that 91 percent of the public companies that they surveyed said 
that the reason why they would not consider the mid-tier firms as an alternative to the 
Big Four is that they did not have the technical skills or knowledge of their industry.  
This view was evidenced by Oxera (2006) who found a general view that the Big 
Four have greater resources and geographical reach to carry out the technical audit for 
larger companies.  The Big Four are thought to be better informed on the latest 
developments in international accounting standards.  McMeeking et al (2006) asserts 
that market concentration is particularly high for companies of above average size. 
 
According to Beattie and Fearnley (1998) fees are the most common reason for 
considering auditor change and influence the choice of new auditor.  They found that 
tenders resulted in significant fee reductions in the year of change.  In contrast, Oxera 
(2006) disagrees with this as there are costs involved when switching auditor: the 
process of ‘re-educating’ the new auditor, the auditor selection process and the 
potential costs of sending a negative signal to the capital market. 
 
Koehler (2006) states that auditors’ unlimited liability deters market entry for smaller 
firms.  The ability of even the Big Four to meet massive claims is severely limited by 
the non-availability of adequate professional indemnity insurance.   The Big Four in 
recent years have found it impossible to obtain commercial insurance at any price in 
the market that is sufficient to cover the risks that they are exposed to.  This is an 
indicator that the market generally perceives the risks that auditors carry to be 
uninsurable and as a result the Big Four have had to rely on their own captive 
insurance vehicles, which have insufficient resources to meet the level of claims that 
auditors are exposed to (Wilson, 2007). 
 
The new independence rules under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 may also limit the 
choice for some public companies (GAO, 2003a).  The scale of additional revenue 
from a large public company could raise independence issues for mid-tier firms. 
Oxera (2006) found that most mid-tier firms would not want to just audit one large 
public company as this would absorb too much of their resources and the Auditing 
Practices Board’s (APB, 2004) Ethical Standards provide that non-audit fees from one 
client should not exceed 10 percent of a firm’s revenue. 
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2.7 Alternatives to Big Four and recommendations for the future 
Joint audits can ensure that an audit is performed with due diligence because of the 
existence of a cross-review and reciprocal monitoring procedures between co-
auditors.  The presence of more than one auditor is perceived to protect independence, 
especially the objectivity of professional judgement, by diluting the effect of 
managerial pressures across two or more auditors (Piot, 2007; Carr, 2006a).  
However, Piot (2007) concludes that the joint-auditing regime does not seem to 
favour routine collaborations between the main audit suppliers and the study indicated 
that the audit market has remained relatively open and competitive.  But BDO Stoy 
Hayward have rejected any proposal to have joint audits stating that it would cause 
tension between rival firms and ramp up costs (Perrin, 2006a).  
 
GAO (2003a) and the London Economic report (2006) found that in general any new 
firm from mergers of the present mid-tier firms would still lack the resources needed 
to compete to any significant degree with the Big Four.  The head of the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) states that the lack of competition 
in the audit market would not be solved by any of the mid-tier firms growing big 
enough to join the Big Four (Solomon and Gullapalli, 2005).  
 
McMeeking (2006 and 2007) suggests amending legislation to introduce other sources 
of audit into the market, such as the Comptroller and Auditor General, Her Majesty’s 
Revenue and Customs (HMRC) and National Audit Office and that competition could 
be gradually improved if the government introduced incentives to encourage the 
growth of the mid-tier auditors. 
 
Liu and Simunic (2005) model shows that firms may strategically differentiate 
themselves by choosing different profit sharing rules in order to specialize in different 
types of clients.  This means that the firms avoid cutthroat competition and earn 
positive economic profits from their niche markets. 
 
Newman (BDO’s managing partner) states that their best chance of getting more 
public company audits is by acting for some clients that get promoted to the FTSE 
350 and persuading them that they do not need a Big Four auditor (Perrin, 2006a). 
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McMeeking (2006) suggests that there should be mandatory disclosure of detailed 
information about the company’s motivation for recruiting and changing their auditor 
and the company’s view of the quality and effectiveness of their auditor.  This then 
should increase competition as audit committees would have more information to 
compare auditors.  Newman (2007) and the Financial Times (2006) write that there 
needs to be greater transparency which will help in the creation of a more dynamic 
and competitive audit market committed to the delivery of the highest quality audits.   
The FRC (2007) in their interim report listed recommendations to improve choice in 
the audit market.  These included greater transparency of the capabilities of the audit 
firms and audit firms should disclose the financial results of their work on statutory 
audit on a comparable basis to name only a few. 
 
Wallace (1987); Beattie and Fearnley (1995); Smith (2005) cited by McMeeking, 
(2006) and Koehler (2006) all agree that competition would be improved if auditor 
liability regulations were relaxed as the removal of this ‘deep pockets’ barrier would 
allow new smaller firms enter the audit market.  The relationship between audit 
market structure and audit liability is empirically unsubstantiated, but, countries with 
caps on auditors’ liability are not to known to have conspicuously higher intensity of 
audit market competition for big clients (Koehler, 2006).  However, the OFT (2004) 
does not find the argument for capping auditors liability compelling.     
 
2.8 What if only Big Three? 
Since the collapse of the last big firm Arthur Anderson in 2002, there is much concern 
about what would happen if the present Big Four were to become the Big Three.  It 
has been widely argued that there is a small but real risk of a massive claim for 
financial damages causing the collapse of one or more of the remaining Big Four 
firms, leading to even higher levels of concentration in the audit market and reduced 
competition between the remaining three large auditors (OFT, 2004; London 
Economics, 2006). 
 
Perrin (2006b) and Oxera (2006) state that if the market were to lose one of the Big 
Four this would make problems worse for auditor choice, requiring regulators to make 
exceptions to auditor independence rules.  Governments elsewhere have recognized 
the risk of the global impacts of the failure of a local auditor and are working to put 
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fairer regimes in place that militate against such occurrences.  Ireland needs to be 
mindful of this and seek to ensure that it does not happen here (Wilson, 2007). 
 
Oxera’s (2006) evidence suggests that if the market was to reduce to a Big Three it 
would still be unlikely for one of the mid-tier firms to try and become a major 
challenger of the remaining three firms and unless perceptions change about the mid-
tier firms it would still be unfeasible to enter the market at this stage.  
 
Jan Babaik (cited by Jopson, 2007) points out that the current Big Four have had a 
brush with reality in recent times.  Ernst and Young faced a challenge from its former 
audit client Equitable Life in the UK courts and eventually emerged triumphant.  
KPMG had to pay a fine of $456m in 2005 to the US Department of Justice and 
narrowly escaped criminal action after admitting to selling ‘fraudulent’ tax avoidance 
schemes.  Deloitte agreed to pay $149m to settle the allegations that it helped to 
prolong fraud at Parmalat, prior to its collapse in 2003.  PricewaterhouseCoopers also 
was forced to downsize its operations in Japan after local regulators banned it for two 
months in 2006 for having poor controls that contributed to fraud of a client. 
 
If the audit market were reduced to a choice of three then the three remaining firms 
will look critically at their listed entities, particularly at the riskier companies and 
decide if they should keep those clients who they consider to have an uneconomic 
level of risk or worse again perhaps exit that particular sector of the audit market 
completely.  This would leave many of world’s riskier companies without an auditor 
(Wilson, 2007). 
 
2.9 Conclusion  
This chapter has considered how the market has evolved into a dominated Big Four 
and the impact on the audit market.  It also outlined the barriers to entry, alternatives 











This chapter identifies and explains the research methodology adopted which will 
include the aims and objectives of the research, the research process, data collection 
methods used and the data analysis method used. 
 
Sekaran (2003, p5) defines research as: 
 
‘an organized, systematic, data-based, critical, objective, scientific inquiry or 
investigation into a specific problem, undertaken with the purpose of finding 
answers or solutions to it.’ 
 
Whereas, Collis and Hussey (2003, p55) state that the: 
 
‘methodology refers to the overall approach to the research process, from the 
theoretical underpinning to the collection and analysis of the data.’ 
 
Therefore one could describe research as an investigation into a specific problem, 
while the methodology is the overall approach to this. 
 
3.2 Research philosophy 
The research philosophy depends on the way we think about the development of 
research and this then affects the way we go about doing research (Saunders et al, 
2003).  The research paradigm is the general approach to the research.  Collis and 
Hussey (2003, p46) state the term ‘paradigm’ refers to: 
 
‘the process of scientific practice based on people’s philosophies and 
assumptions about the world and the nature of knowledge; … about how 
research should be conducted.’   
 
Two research paradigms dominate the literature; these are referred to as positivism 
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and interpretivism.  They are different, if not mutually exclusive, views about the way 
in which knowledge is developed and judged as being acceptable (Saunders et al, 
2003).   
 
Positivism is when there is only one truth that all agree upon, it is a structured 
approach to collecting data, which is analyzed and interpreted in a factual statistical 
manner. While interpretivism, otherwise referred to as phenomenology, has many 
truths and is a more flexible approach to the collection of data that focuses on the 
meanings behind the research.  The subject matter of audit choice for listed companies 
could possibly have many truths. 
 
3.2.1 Positivism/ Interpretivism 
Saunders et al (2003) suggests that if the research philosophy reflects the principles of 
positivism then the researcher will probably adopt the philosophical stance of the 
natural scientist.  Positivism implies that the researcher is: 
 
‘working with  an observable social reality and that the end product of such 
research can be the derivation of laws or law-like generalizations similar to 
those produced by the physical and natural scientists.’ (Remenyi et al, 2003, 
p32) 
 
Saunders et al (2003) and Remenyi et al (2003) refer to the researcher as an objective 
analyst in this tradition.  Positivism is based on the concept that other similar studies 
should be comparable and achieve similar results.   
 
However, according to Saunders et al (2003) the researchers critical of positivism 
argue that the rich insights into this complex world are lost if such complexity is 
reduced entirely to a series of law-like generalizations.  Therefore interpretivism was 
developed due to the criticisms of positivism.  Collis and Hussey (2003) list the main 
criticisms of the positivistic paradigm which include: it is impossible to treat people 
as being separate from their social contexts and they cannot be understood without 
examining the perceptions they have of their own activities; a highly structured 
research design imposes certain constraints on the results and may ignore more 
relevant and interesting findings; researchers are not objective, but part of what they 
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observe; capturing complex phenomena in a single measure is at best misleading, for 
example, is it possible to assign a numerical value to a person’s intelligence? 
 
Interpretivism assumes that the social world is continually changing and that the 
researcher is a part of this.  In contrast to the positivist paradigm, rather than studying 
facts and developing a series of law like generalization, interpretivism is concerned 
with understanding and appreciating the different constructions and meanings that 
people place on their experience (Easterby-Smith et al, 2002; Saunders et al, 2003).  
According to Collis and Hussey (2003) what is researched cannot be unaffected by 
the process of the research.   
 
The table below summaries the main features of the two paradigms and contrasts the 
differences between them: 
 
Table 3.1 The main features of Positivism and Interpretivism 
Positivism Interpretivism 
Tends to produce quantitative data Tends to produce qualitative data 
Uses large samples Uses small samples 
Concerned with hypothesis testing Concerned with generating theories 
Data is highly specific and precise Data is rich and subjective 
The location is artificial The location is natural 
Reliability is high Reliability is low 
Validity is low Validity is high 
Generalizes from sample to population Generalizes from one setting to another 
           (Collis and Hussey, 2003, p55) 
 
3.2.2 Research philosophy adopted 
The choice of research philosophy will depend on the research aims and objectives.  
 
This dissertation aimed to address the following issues: 
 How has the audit market evolved in the past 20 years? 
 Do listed companies have a choice when selecting an auditor? 
 What is the future of choice in the audit market? 
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The research objectives were to: 
 Find the causes of audit market concentration. 
 Discover the impact of audit market concentration on the market. 
 Determine the main criteria in selecting an auditor.  
 State the barriers to entry to the audit market of listed companies by non Big 
Four firms. 
 Describe the alternatives to an audit from the Big Four. 
 Investigate recommendations to increase competition in the audit market. 
 Investigate what would happen if one of the Big Four were to disappear. 
 
The data collections methods were: literature previously written on the topic, 
questionnaires and a semi-structured interview.  These are discussed in more detail in 
sections 3.5 and 3.7. 
 
The first research aim was refined into the first two objectives.  These objectives were 
answered solely by the literature.  The next aim of the research was broken down into 
three objectives: audit selection criteria, barriers to entry and alternatives to the Big 
Four.  The objective regarding main criteria was answered by the questionnaire, the 
objective about barriers to entry was answered by the interview and the one 
concerning alternatives was answered by both the questionnaires and the interview.  
The final aim was divided into the last two objectives, which were answered by both 
primary methods of data collection. 
 
The researcher used both philosophies, as semi-structured interviews are interpretative 
in nature and questionnaires are positivistic.  The interview involved the researcher 
interpreting the opinions of the interviewee in the analysis and findings chapter.  The 
findings were open to the researcher’s observer bias at this stage. Questionnaires 
however are more quantifiable in nature by the use of yes/no answers and the Likert 






3.3 Research approach 
There are two possible approaches to research, namely inductive and deductive 
research.  Inductive research is when theory is developed from the observation of 
empirical reality, thus general inferences are induced from particular instances.  On 
the other hand, deductive research is when a conceptual and theoretical structure is 
developed and then tested by theoretical observation; therefore particular instances are 
deduced from general inferences (Collis and Hussey, 2003).  As the researcher 
developed the theory from data collected via questionnaires and an interview the 
research was therefore inductive. 
 
3.4 Research focus  
This research may be classed as descriptive in nature since it involves an analysis of 
choice in the audit market and the relevant literature.  The object of descriptive 
research is to: 
 
‘to portray an accurate profile of persons, events or situations.’  
       (Robson, 2002, p59) 
 
Descriptive research may be an extension of, or a forerunner to a piece of exploratory 
research.  This research also aimed to find out the future of choice in the audit market 
and this part of the research was exploratory in nature.  Robson (2002, p59) writes 
that exploratory studies are a valuable means of finding out: 
 
‘what is happening; to seek new insights; to ask questions and to assess 
phenomena in a new light.’ 
 
The great advantage of this type of research is that it is flexible and adaptable to 
change.  Therefore the researcher must be willing to change direction due to new data 
and new insights found (Saunders et al, 2003). 
 
3.5 Data collection methods 
The type of methods used depends on the research and the researcher.  These methods 
include case studies, observation, interviews and surveys.  This section will focus on 
the methodologies of questionnaires and interviews, as these are the methods that 
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were used by the researcher.   
 
3.5.1 Questionnaires 
A questionnaire was used in order to investigate the opinions of financial controllers 
on the topic of choice in the audit market.  The questionnaire was adapted to suit the 
Irish audit market from the survey used by Oxera (2006) in their primary research 
(Appendix E).  The research instrument used had the advantage of having its external 
validity tested in another country.  The questionnaire was pilot tested prior to 
circulation by a financial controller of a company listed on the Irish Stock Exchange 
and only a minor change was made.   
 
The researcher posted questionnaires to all listed companies on the Irish Stock 
Exchange, 71 in total (Appendix G).  The researcher addressed the questionnaire to 
the financial controller of each company.  Each financial controller received a 
questionnaire, a cover letter and a stamped addressed envelope.  As the researcher had 
surveyed the whole population according to Saunders et al (2003) this was a census. 
 
Given the time and financial constraints of the research, the researcher thought that 
questionnaires were the best option to give the most reliable and general information 
although they do have their limitations, namely possible low response rates and the 
respondent’s poor knowledge of the topic.  However, the researcher tried to overcome 
these limitations by including prepaid self addressed envelopes and a financial 
incentive of giving money to charity for every response received by a certain date.  
The researcher asked the respondent to state their position in the company on the 
questionnaires.   
 
Collis and Hussey (2003) describe a questionnaire as being a list of carefully 
structured questions with a view to eliciting reliable responses from the chosen 












         
                  
 
                  (Saunders et al, 2003, p282) 
 
The choice of questionnaire will be influenced by the factors related to the research 
aims and objectives, these include: characteristics of the respondent; the importance 
of reaching a particular person as respondent; the types and number of questions you 
need to ask and the sample size (Saunders et al, 2003). 
 
Questionnaires are a widely used research tool, however, Easterby-Smith et al (2002) 
state that they may seem simple to use but their design is by no means simple.  Collis 
and Hussey (2003) outline a number of issues to be considered when using 
questionnaires, these include: sample size, type of questions, wording of questions, 
cover letter, method of distribution and tests for validity and reliability. 
 
3.5.2 Interviews 
In order to discover the views of non Big Four firms and particularly to find the 
barriers to entry for non Big Four firms and the future for the audit market, one semi-
structured interview was conducted (Appendix D).  Both forms of data collection 
were needed in order to answer all the research objectives. 
 










1957).  Interviews may be an effective way of obtaining valid and reliable data that is 
relevant to the research questions and objectives.  There are three types of interview: 
unstructured, semi-structured and structured. 
 
Unstructured interviews are usually conducted on a one to one basis, the aspiration of 
which is to get past short answers from which to establish the true inspirations and 
depth that influence a person’s opinion.  Sample sizes are small and tend to be time 
consuming as they are conducted on a one to one basis.  Interpretation of findings is 
also difficult and time consuming as there is no standard on which to base the 
findings. 
 
Semi-structured interviews involve the researcher having a list of general topics or 
questions already prepared before the interview.  These questions may vary from 
interview to interview as some questions may be omitted and new questions raised by 
either the interviewer or interviewee.  Semi-structured interviews make interpretation 
of the findings simpler as there may partly be a standard on which you can base your 
findings. 
 
Structured interviews as the name suggests is based on a predetermined list of 
questions.  The interviewer reads out the questions and then records the response on a 
standardized schedule, which usually has pre-coded answers (Saunders et al, 2003).  
There is little interaction between interviewer and interviewee. 
 
Due to the limited resources of the researcher it was only possible to conduct one 
semi-structured interview.  The interviewee was chosen using systematic random 
sampling from the top 20 accountancy firms in Ireland as per fee income for the year 
2005 (Appendix F).  The interview was conducted by telephone in early June 2007 
and was approximately thirty minutes in duration.  The interview was tape recorded 
by kind permission of the interviewee (Appendix D). 
 
According to Saunders et al (2003) there is a need to record an interview soon after it 
is conducted in order to control bias and to produce reliable data for analysis.  One 
method of recording an interview effectively is by using a tape recorder.  The 
advantages and disadvantages of which are outlined in table 3.2. 
 22 
 
Table 3.2 Advantages and disadvantage of tape-recording an interview  
Advantages Disadvantages 
Allows the interviewer to concentrate on 
questioning and listening 
May adversely affect the relationship 
between interviewee and interviewer 
Allows questions formulated in an 
interview to be accurately recorded for 
use in later interviews 
May inhibit some interviewee responses 
and reduce reliability 
Can re-listen to the interview Possibility of a technical problem 
Provides an accurate and unbiased record Disruption to discussion when changing 
tapes 
Allows for direct quoting Time required to transcribe the tape 
It is a permanent record which can be 
used by others 
 
(Saunders et al, 2003, p264) 
 
3.6 Data analysis 
The data collected from the questionnaires was analyzed using SPSS 13.0 for 
windows.  The researcher had prior experience with the software and used the 
package to construct tables and graphs for the data analysis chapter and appendices.  
The questionnaire used yes/no questions and rating questions otherwise known as 
Likert-style rating questions.  This type of question asks the respondents how strongly 
they agree or disagree with a statement or a series of statements (Saunders et al, 
2003).  The Likert style questions are useful to find out the opinions of the 
respondents where yes/no questions are not appropriate. 
 
A transcript was produced of the interview conducted and the interviewee was quoted 
or paraphrased in the text of the data analysis chapter. 
 
3.7 Secondary research 
The researcher examined books, academic journals, articles and any other literature 
relevant to this research.  The researcher also obtained a copy of the financial 
statements of all the companies on the Irish Stock Exchange in order to get contact 
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details to send the questionnaires to.  
 
3.8 Conclusion 
This research was undertaken to investigate choice in the audit market for companies 
listed on the Irish Stock Exchange.  It involved both the positivistic and 
phenomenological philosophies.  The research was both descriptive and exploratory 
in nature.  The research process involved the circulation of 71 surveys and an 




























Findings & Analysis 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the results of the research methods adopted 
for this study.  This involved an examination of the survey responses and a review of 
the transcript from the interview in order to ascertain the interviewee’s views on the 
study.  Conclusions will then be discussed in chapter five. 
 
4.2 Analysis of survey results and the interview findings 
The questionnaire was sent to the 71 companies listed on the Irish Stock Exchange.  
At the end of the data collection period a total of 33 responses were received, yielding 
a 46.5 percent response rate (Table C.1). Tables of all the findings from the 
questionnaires can be found in Appendix C. 
 
A semi-structured interview was conducted with a partner of a firm outside the top 
four but within the top 20 in Ireland as per fee income (Appendix F).  The purpose of 
the interview was to find out the barriers to entry for these non Big Four firms and to 
perhaps find some alternatives to an audit by the Big Four.  The interviewee was 
assured that they would remain anonymous and therefore they are referred to as ‘the 
interviewee’.  A transcript of the interview is included in Appendix D. 
 
4.2.1 Demographic results 
The majority of respondents were Chief Financial Officers at 75.8 percent; others 








































Respondents were asked which accountancy firms they have used in the last 12 
months for four different categories of work (Table C.3).  79.5 percent of the 
respondents’ audit firm was one of the Big Four, compared to 96 percent for Irish 
companies in a report by Grant Thornton (Shoesmith, 2007).  Similarly 80.9 percent 
of the respondents stated that their tax adviser was one of the Big Four.  The 
concentration of audit work performed by the Big Four is high but not as high as in 
the UK with the Big Four auditing all but one of the FTSE 100 companies (Oxera, 
2006). 
 
4.2.2 The main criteria in selecting an auditor 
The most important determinants of choice were: auditor is one of the Big Four at 
51.5 percent, quality of staff at 48.5 percent and technical accounting skill, reputation 
and relationship with auditor all at 36.4 percent (Table C.5).   Oxera’s (2006) 
respondents’ rate reputation and quality of staff as important as well, but they also 
rate sector specific skills and international coverage as important determinants of 
 26 
choice.  This would show differences in the opinion of the audit committee chairs in 
the UK and the Chief Financial Officers in the Republic of Ireland. The interviewee 
stated that auditor selection is based on reputation rather than insistence by anyone; 
this further reiterates the opinion of the respondents in both surveys.  However, when 
respondents were asked to rate these factors they did not rate auditor is one of the Big 
Four as the most essential, with only 42.4 percent essential and 21.2 percent not just 
essential (63.6 percent essential or not just essential in total).  60.6 percent rated 
technical accounting skill as essential and 15.2 percent as not just essential (75.8 
percent in total).  This was followed by quality of staff at 51.5 percent essential and 
42.4 percent not just essential (93.9 percent in total).  Reputation was rated essential 
by 45.5 percent of respondents and not just essential by 27.3 percent (72.8 percent in 
total) (Table C.6). 
 
The most likely scenario that will make companies change auditor is a breakdown in 
the working relationship between auditor and management, as 90.9 percent stated this 
is likely or very likely per table 4.1.  The next most likely scenario would be a fault 
with the quality of the audit opinion as 87.9 percent stated this is likely or very likely.  
The other three scenarios were rated as being more unlikely.   
 
Table 4.1 Scenarios to change auditor 
 Very 
likely 




 % % % % % % 
A breakdown in the 
working relationship 
between auditor and 
management 
60.6 30.3 6.1 3.0 0.0 0.0 
A fault with the quality 
of the audit opinion 
51.5 36.4 6.1 3.0 0.0 3.0 
A disagreement with the 
auditor over the 
interpretation of 
accounting standards 
3.0 21.2 39.4 15.2 18.2 3.0 
A substantial increase in 
the audit fee (e.g., 15% 
or above) 
18.2 21.2 30.3 24.2 6.1 0.0 
Your company’s auditor 
starts auditing one of 
your company’s main 
competitors 
0.0 9.1 18.2 30.3 39.4 3.0 
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The person whose view is most taken into consideration when choosing an auditor 
was the Finance Director, as 90.9 percent of respondents stated they were important 
or very important (Table C.10).  The Chief Executive and Chairman followed this at 
78.8 and 57.6 percent respectively.  The survey found that major shareholders are not 
rated as very important with only 15.2 and 21.2 percent respectively.  The interviewee 
confirmed this finding when they stated that individual investors, other than 
institutional investors, have limited enough influence over the selection of auditors.   
 
4.2.3 The main barriers to entry for non Big Four firms 
The most significant factor discouraging a change of auditor is the management time 
required at 33.3 percent very significant and 21.2 percent significant (Table C.9).  
The next significant factor is the possible negative signal to shareholders of changing 
auditors rated at 18.2 percent very significant and 27.3 percent significant.  The least 
important factor is that the company would have to change the supplier of related 
services as only 15.1 percent rated it very significant or significant. 
 
In the survey no one company had a set policy of changing auditors after a set period 
of time (Table C.7). This may demonstrate that a policy of changing auditors is not a 
























Once every 5 years
Once every 4 years
Once every 3 years
 
 
Figure 4.2 demonstrates that 60.6 percent of respondents tender for their audit less 
often that every five years (Table C.4).  21.2 percent of the respondents stated that 
they tendered for audit once every five years.  Ghosh and Lustgarten (2006) and 
Oxera (2006) both found that switching rates are low for clients of Big Four for audit 
work.  Therefore these results are comparable to other countries like the USA and UK 
as the GAO (2003b) also found that the majority of respondents were satisfied with 
their current auditor and the longer they had the same one the happier they were. 
 
The Big Four accountancy firms were known quite well to all respondents with 
ratings for ‘know very well’ and ‘know well’ at 87.9 percent for 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, 72.7 percent for KPMG, 57.6 percent for Deloitte & Touche 
and 72.8 percent for Ernst & Young (Table C.11).  The next four accountancy firms 
by fee income after the Big Four were only rated around 20 percent well known with 
only BDO rated at 18.2 percent as known very well.  The bottom 12 were not that 
well known to the respondents with ratings from 12.1 to 68.8 for ‘never heard of’.  
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These findings were also reflected when respondents were asked which firms would 
be reasonable substitutes for their company.  The Big Four were rated as reasonable 
substitutes as the respondents rated those at 57 percent and higher whilst BDO, Grant 
Thornton and Mazars only received over 18 percent (Table C.12).  The other 17 firms 
were not considered at all as reasonable substitutes with only two firms attaining 3 
percent each i.e. only one respondent.  These results are comparable to the findings of 
GAO (2003b) as 88 percent said they would not use non Big Four auditors instead.  
63.6 percent of respondents stated that it was fairly unlikely or very unlikely that they 
would consider a non Big Four firm for their company’s audit (Table C.14). 
 
The main reason why companies will not use the non Big Four firms was that they 
believe that there is no credibility with relevant stakeholders in the event of an audit 
problem at 54.5 percent (Table C.15).  This finding supports a lot of previous authors 
like the OFT (2001), Oxera (2006) and McMeeking et al (2006).  The second main 
reason why the respondents will not use the mid-tier firms was reputation.  These 
findings about credibility and reputation were also the opinions of the interviewee, 
who said: 
 
‘ I suppose really there you are talking about lack of experience, in that 
historically there would not have been involved in that market and also that 
has let to a perception that anyone else outside the Big Four could not 
possibly handle a listed audit. But I think thankfully that this is becoming less 
and less as time goes on.’ 
 
The interviewee stated that it would take time for the misconceptions about the mid-
tier firms to be overcome and they stated that it might take one or two of the larger 
Public Limited Companies to move away from the Big Four to perhaps open up the 
market.  The interviewee noted that there is probably a need as well for the mid-tier 
firms to make their capabilities known, as they can be proactive about this. 
 
39.4 percent of the respondents stated that they would not consider the non Big Four 
firms at any price (Table C.16).  This is more significant than it would first appear, as 
30.3 percent of the respondents were not required to answer this question, meaning a 
higher percentage for those who answered.  This view is not shared with Beattie and 
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Fearnley (1998) as they state the most common reason to change auditors and 
influence the choice of auditor is fees.   
 
Many of the companies would only really consider BDO (63.6 percent) and Grant 
Thornton (54.5 percent) as technically capable of performing their company audit.  
Mazars were only rated at 33.3 percent, Farell Grant Sparks at 27.3 percent and 
Horwath Bastow Charleton at 21.2 percent.  12.1 percent of respondents thought that 
none of the firms between the Big Four and top 20 would be technically capable and 
21.2 percent of respondents did not know if they were technically capable (Table 
C.17).  A similar opinion of poor technical skill by the non Big Four was also found 
by the GAO (2003a) and Oxera (2006) and McMeeking et al (2006).  However, the 
interviewee believed that: 
 
‘… going forward, a lot of the mid-tier firms are just as well capable of 
handling anything that any Big Four can.’ 
 
Figure 4.3 Significant differences in the quality of an audit provided by the non 
Big Four firms compared to the Big Four firms 
Don't knowOther, mid-tier firms
can be of higher quality
No, mid tier firms are of
comparable quality




















Figure 4.3 illustrates that 42.4 percent of respondents believed that the Big Four are 
always higher quality, however 39.4 percent stated that mid-tier firms are of 
comparable quality and another 3 percent stated that mid-tier firms can be of higher 
quality (Table C.18).  Therefore, the respondents would appear to be mixed in their 
views. This does not quite correlate with the findings of table C.14 where the majority 
of respondents stated that it would be unlikely or very unlikely to consider the non 
Big Four firms for their company audit.  
 
The interviewee stated that the present unlimited auditors’ liability means that mid-
tier firms would find it is a huge risk to take on one big client, that could probably 
bring down a whole practice and if you are outside the Big Four you are not going to 
have the same level of fee income, therefore, the Institute of Chartered Accountants 
requirements are a barrier but they are driven by independence rules.  This to some 
extent supports the views of authors like McMeeking (2006) and Koehler (2006) who 
think that improved auditor liability regulations would allow smaller firms to enter the 
audit market.    
 
4.2.4 The alternatives to an audit from the Big Four 
The interviewee stated that the alternatives are the mid-tier firms and any of those 
outside the Big Four.  The most important factor or development in making the non 
Big Four firms a realistic alternative to the Big Four was that they have equivalent 
technical auditing ability to a Big Four firm, 69.7 percent (Table C.20).  On the other 
hand it is interesting that the respondents do not consider many of the present mid-tier 
firms as technically capable, as already stated under section 4.2.3 (Table C.17).  The 
next most important factor would be the international coverage of the mid-tier firm 
that it is also equivalent to a Big Four firm, 51.5 percent.  The third most important 
factor was that the firm would have a reputation among major shareholders like that 
of the Big Four. 
 
The most serious alternative that the respondents would consider at 72.7 percent was a 
firm formed from a merger of several mid-tier firms to create an accounting firm of 
comparable size to the Big Four (Table C.21).  The second alternative at 24.2 percent 
was a new entrant to the auditing market engaged purely in audit, with ex-Big Four 
staff.  It must also be noted that 9.1 percent stated that none of these alternatives 
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would be suitable.  66.7 percent of respondents stated that no factors would exclude 
another accounting firm from performing their audit work (Table C.22). 
 
The interviewee felt that there is not enough choice in the audit market at present and 
39.4 percent of the respondents also agreed as per figure 4.4, but, 51.6 percent of 
respondents tend to agree or strongly agree that there is enough choice in the audit 
market (Table C.23).   
 
Figure 4.4 Choice in the audit market 
Strongly disagreeTend to disagreeNeither agree nor
disagree


















4.2.5 Recommendations to increase choice in the audit market 
The interviewee suggested that maybe the government could support rotation of 
auditors by perhaps legislation; at least companies are then changing auditors every 
five years for example.  This will force them as least to look for alternatives and 
might draw them outside the Big Four box as part of that process.  
 
The interviewee said that if you look at the accountancy journals you would see the 
number of firms that are merging now.  Maybe they are outside the top 20 but as a 
merged entity, all of a sudden they could be the top 20 and that is probably showing 
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an appetite that if they have merged once they will probably do it again.  
 
The interviewee also felt that mid-tier firms do want to compete with the Big Four 
and they think that the mid-tier firms would like the Big Four’s presence on the 
consultancy side and their ability to attract new business.  The interviewee said that 
their mid-tier firm and a lot of other firms would be very well placed to service 
privately owned larger companies.  However, audit has become so specialised now 
that there may not be the same appetite for it.   
 
4.2.6 What would happen if one of the Big Four were to disappear 
Figure 4.5 illustrates that 36.4 percent and 30.3 percent of respondents stated that it is 
not at all likely or not very likely to use a non Big Four firm if their auditor went out 
of business (Table C.19).  When one compares these results with the results of table 
C.14 where 21.2 and 42.4 percent of respondents state it is unlikely or very unlikely to 
consider a non Big Four firm for their audit it would appear that respondents are quite 



















Figure 4.5 The likelihood of considering a non Big Four firm if the respondents 














The chapter analysed and discussed the main findings of both the postal questionnaire 
and the interview, which were conducted by the author.  From this, one can see that 
the questionnaire and the interview have confirmed and backed up the work of a 










Conclusions & Recommendations 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to summarise the main findings of the research, to draw 
conclusions, and to make recommendations and suggestions for further areas of 
research based on the findings of the study.  It also examines whether the aims and 
objectives of this dissertation were met.   
 
A review of the literature into the area of choice in the audit market revealed a lack of 
information about the choice for companies listed on the Irish Stock Exchange.  The 
review of the literature also developed the research question, which was further 
refined into research aims and objectives.   
 
In order to answer the research question ‘Is there audit choice for companies listed on 
the Irish Stock Exchange’ the following aims were derived: 
 How has the audit market evolved in the past 20 years? 
 Do listed companies have a choice when selecting an auditor? 
 What is the future of choice in the audit market? 
 
5.2 Overview of the main findings  
The conclusions of this research are broken down under the headings of each research 
objective as outlined in chapter three.  The research objectives were met in a few 
different ways, namely: a semi-structured interview, questionnaires and an extensive 
review of the literature.   
 
5.2.1 The causes of audit market concentration 
A review of the literature found that the main causes of audit market concentration 
were the mergers of accountancy firms during the eighties and nineties, and the 
collapse of Arthur Anderson in 2002.  In the early eighties there was the Big Eight but 




5.2.2 The impact of audit market concentration on the market 
McMeeking (2007) and Oxera (2006) both found that higher concentration in the 
market led to higher audit fees, but Menon and Williams (2001) disagree stating no 
long term effect on audit fees.  Ivancevich and Zardkoohi (2000); Pearson and 
Trompter (1994) and Tonge and Wooton (1991) all conclude that the mergers 
produced more competition in the audit market, though Beattie et al (2003) disagrees 
with this point.  Koehler (2006) found that the Big Four have a virtual monopoly in 
auditing large companies in nearly every country and this is backed by Oxera (2006) 
in the UK and Cunningham (2005) in the USA.  However, the OFT (2002) in the UK 
and the GAO (2003a) in the USA conducted preliminary research to whether there is 
competition problems in the market but nothing was found to be impairing 
competition in either country. 
 
5.2.3 The main criteria in selecting an auditor 
The results of the survey found that the most important determinants of choice were: 
auditor is one of the Big Four, quality of staff, technical accounting skill, reputation 
and relationship with auditor. Similarly the interviewee said that selection of auditor 
was based purely on reputation rather than insistence by anyone.  These findings were 
different to some of Oxera’s (2006) most important determinants of choice: 
international coverage and sector specific skills.  However, respondents contradicted 
themselves when asked to rate these factors and consequently rated technical 
accounting skill as most essential. 
 
The most likely scenario that would make companies change their auditor was a 
breakdown in the working relationship between the auditor and management.  
Therefore one could say that the respondents would change over differences in 
opinion rather than any mandatory matters.   
 
The opinions of those who work daily for the company are taken more into 
consideration than the shareholders and audit committee per the respondents.  This 
might not be the best position for the companies to be in, as the auditor audits the 
work prepared by the Finance Director and Chief Executive.  The shareholders were 
only rated at 36.4 percent important or very important when choosing an auditor.  
This low rating for shareholders is quite alarming as the shareholders appoint the 
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auditor at the Annual General Meeting.  On the other hand, the interviewee said that 
institutional investors have some influence over choice.  Thus, if one could persuade 
these investors to use the mid-tier firms, this might open the market up.  However, 
accountancy firms are constrained by independence rules by the APB as to how much 
of their fee income can come from the one client. 
 
 
5.2.4 The main barriers to entry for non Big Four firms 
Unfortunately there are many barriers to entry for non Big Four firms into the large 
audit market, these include: perception bias against the non Big Four, reputation, 
international coverage, lack of staff and expertise, independence issues and exposure 
to unlimited liability (GAO, 2003a; London Economics, 2006; Oxera, 2006).   
 
It was interesting to find that not one of the respondents had a set policy of changing 
auditors.  This was also reflected when 60.6 percent of respondents stated that they 
tender for their audit less often than every five years.  One could conclude from this 
that in general the companies are happy with their current auditor and do not feel that 
it is necessary to be on the look out for another auditor.  Therefore, this would be a 
barrier to entry for other firms, as companies have no set policy to change auditors 
after a set period of time and have low tendering rates. 
 
As auditors are selected mainly by their reputation, this research would indicate that 
the non Big Four firms would need to familiarise themselves with the Finance 
Directors, Chief Executives, investors and audit committees of large companies.  In 
the questionnaire respondents were asked to rate how well they knew each of the top 
20 accountancy firms in Ireland.  The Big Four were rated as known well or very 
well, whereas only a few of the mid-tier firms were rated accordingly.  If the 
respondent had never heard of a mid-tier firm, then they would not consider that firm 
for their company’s audit either.  Oxera (2006) found that if the market was to reduce 
to a Big Three it would still be unlikely for one of the mid-tier firms to try and 
become a major challenger of the remaining three firms unless perceptions change.   
 
As reputation is such a big determinant for the choice of an auditor it is only 
reasonable to expect that when respondents were asked who would they consider as 
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reasonable substitutes for their auditor that many rated the other Big Four firms and 
only three of the mid-tier firms.  This reputation barrier was also suggested by the 
interviewee and the GAO (2003b).  If further research was conducted into this area it 
would be interesting to discover why the respondents feel that so many of the mid-tier 
firms would not be a reasonable substitute for their auditor.  63.6 percent of 
respondents stated that they would be unlikely or very unlikely to use a mid-tier firm 
for their company’s audit.  This supports the respondents’ poor rating of the mid-tier 
firms as reasonable substitutes.  Credibility with stakeholders was the main reason 
given for not using the non Big Four firms and reputation was the second reason 
given. 
 
39.4 percent of respondents said they would not consider mid-tier firms at any price. 
This is more significant than it would first appear, as 30.3 percent of the respondents 
were not required to answer this question, meaning a higher percentage for those who 
answered.  One could conclude from this that money is not an issue when it comes to 
selecting an auditor for these companies.  However, Beattie and Fearnley (1998) 
disagree stating that the most common reason to change auditor is due to audit fees. 
 
In the primary research, technical accounting skill was deemed to be the most 
important factor involved in the choice of auditor.  Yet the perception of the 
respondents was that many of the mid-tier firms were not technically capable.  
Therefore, that this may be one of the reasons why many firms were not even 
considered as a realistic option.  The interviewee however, stated that the mid-tier 
firms were just as well capable to handle the audit of a listed company as the Big Four 
and they asserted that the perception bias against the mid-tier firms is changing.  As 
for a solution to these misconceptions about the mid-tier firms the interviewee 
believed it will take time to change the views of people and the mid-tier firms need to 
make their capabilities known.  Kennedy (2007) a freelance journalist for 
Accountancy Ireland has recently written articles on a few of the different mid-tier 
firms in Ireland.  If more stakeholders in the audit selection decision were to read this 
type of article, it could encourage them to use a mid-tier firm. 
 
Even though 42.4 percent of respondents believed that the Big Four are always of 
higher quality, 39.4 percent believed that the mid-tier firms are of comparable quality 
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and another 3 percent stated that mid-tier firms can be of higher quality.  Therefore 
one could conclude that quality is not a barrier to entry for the mid-tier firms, 
although one does not know if this includes all mid-tier firms.  However as already 
stated, reputation and technical accounting capabilities are major barriers to entry for 
most mid-tier firms.  Therefore it would appear that the major barriers to entry are the 
perceptions of the respondents and not the actual quality of the mid-tier firms 
themselves. 
 
5.2.5 The alternatives to an audit from the Big Four and recommendations to 
increase choice in the audit market. 
Some of the alternatives and recommendations in the literature included joint audit, 
other sources of audit, specialization in niche markets and mergers of the mid-tier 
firms. Greater transparency of information was also mentioned by a number of 
different authors to help improve choice in the audit market (FRC, 2007; Newman, 
2007; Financial Times, 2006; McMeeking, 2006). 
 
The interviewee suggested rotation of auditors as a way to increase choice in the audit 
market.  The respondents on the other hand, felt that the most realistic alternative 
would be a merger of several mid-tier firms to compete with the Big Four firms. 
Conversely, GAO (2003a); Solomon and Gullapalli (2005) and the London 
Economics report (2006) said that the merger of several mid-tier firms would still lack 
the resources needed to compete with the Big Four.  In addition the interviewee 
thought that the mid-tier firms do want to compete with the Big Four, especially in the 
lucrative consultancy sector, but not necessarily in the audit market as this is not as 
profitable as non audit services. 
 
At present the interviewee felt that there is not enough choice in the audit market, 
39.4 percent of the respondents agreed with the interviewee.  However, the majority 
of respondents at 51.6 percent tend to agree that there is currently enough choice in 
the audit market.   
 
5.2.6 What would happen if one of the Big Four were to disappear 
Jopson (2007) notes how all the Big Four firms have recently had problems with 
major clients and had to go to the courtrooms.  If the market were to be left dominated 
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by a Big Three this would be worse for choice and competition in the market (Perrin, 
2006b).   This would also give the Big Three the power to pick and choose which 
clients they wish to have and the riskier clients (the ones in most need of an audit) 
will have great difficulty in finding an auditor (Wilson, 2007). 
 
66.7 percent of respondents would still not consider a mid-tier firm if their auditor 
went out of business.  This is worrying; as choice decreases the respondents will still 
not consider the mid-tier firms. 
 
5.3 Recommendations 
One recommendation is to provide more transparent information about all audit firms, 
not just the Big Four.  The literature and the primary research both found that there 
are perception differences about the technical skill and quality of work that the mid-
tier firms are capable of.   
 
The researcher would also recommend that companies would tender their audits more 
frequently and especially to firms outside the Big Four.  This would at least provide a 
little choice in the short term and would help them decipher who is capable of their 
company’s audit. 
 
To improve choice in the long term for companies, the smaller audit firms will need to 
be more proactive in their approach to finding new business and retaining their 
growing clients.  Companies have changed to a Big Four auditor when they have 
become a listed entity on the stock exchange but this is not always necessary, 
companies could keep their mid-tier firm instead. 
 
Auditors’ unlimited liability needs to be rectified by the Irish government, as there is 
currently an unfair advantage for other European audit firms that can audit here and 
have a cap on their liability at the same time (Wilson, 2007).   
 
The competition authority in Ireland and other countries will need to keep an eye on 
competition in the audit market, as there are only four global accountancy firms to 
choose from for some companies. 
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5.4 Areas of future research 
As this research was limited by the resources of time and money, further research 
could be undertaken to include the views of all accountancy firms and all companies 
that require an audit.  This research could be broken down into choice in the audit 
market for small, medium and large companies.  The larger companies, even though 
they are not listed on any stock exchange, may feel that their choice is also limited.   
 
Research could also be directed at government audit work, as this is very specialised 
work.  This then could help choice in the market place if the government can be seen 
to be using these firms. 
 
Research could be undertaken in the area of auditors’ unlimited liability.  Research 
would be useful in this area to find out if this really does hinder firms here in Ireland 
or give European firms an advantage by being able to cap their liability.  Chapter two 
reviewed both sides of the argument and it was found to be not that compelling by the 
OFT (2004). 
  
Research could also be undertaken to discover the differences in fee income by the 
Big Four and non Big Four firms.  It was found in the literature that the Big Four 
charge a premium (Gonthier-Besacier and Schatt, 2007; Oxera, 2006) for their work 
and research could be done to discover if this premium is worthwhile. 
 
5.5 Conclusion  
The findings of this research have given a valuable insight into choice in the audit 
market for companies listed on the Irish Stock Exchange.  Companies by a small 
majority felt that they have enough choice in the market at present, although the 
interviewee disagreed strongly with this.  More work needs to be done in this area to 
increase choice in the market especially if there would be another repeat like that of 
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Dear Sir/ Madam, 
 
I am currently undertaking a Masters of Accounting at Letterkenny Institute of 
Technology.  As part of my studies I am preparing a dissertation on the choice of 
auditors for companies that are listed on the Irish Stock Exchange.  This is a much 
debated topic at present and this research should give some indication into how much 
choice is in Ireland specifically, as there has been no other primary research 
conducted in this area in Ireland before. 
 
I would be very grateful if you could complete the enclosed questionnaire on audit 
choice in Ireland.  It should take approximately five minutes of your time to complete.  
I have also enclosed a stamped addressed envelope for your convenience.   
 
Your response is very important and as an incentive to complete the questionnaire I 
will donate €5 to charity for every response received by the 18
th
 of June 2007.** 
 
All responses will remain strictly confidential.  You will notice that your name and 
address do not appear on the questionnaire itself and that there is no identification 
number.   
 
If you would like a copy of the final version of my dissertation please enclose the 
name and address of who would like to receive it. 
 













Survey: Audit choice for companies listed on the Irish Stock Exchange 
 
Q1 Please state your position within the company ______________________ 
 
Q2 Which accounting firm or firms has your company used for audit and other 
accounting services over the last 12 months?     (Please Tick) 





ry (e.g., IT 
Consultancy) 
PricewaterhouseCoopers     
Deloitte     
KPMG     
Ernst & Young     
BDO Simpson Xavier     
Grant Thornton     
Mazars     
Farrell Grant Sparks     
Horwath Bastow 
Charleton 
    
Russell Brennan Keane     
Oliver Freaney     
HLB Nathans      
RSM Robson Rhodes     
OSK     
UHY O’Connor Leddy 
Holmes 
    
JPA Brenson Lawlor     
PKF Ryan Glennon     
Ormsby & Rhodes     
Moores Stephens Caplin 
Meehan 
    
Baker Tilly O’Hare     
Other (please specify)     
Don’t know     
Refuse to answer     
 
 
Q3 Approximately how frequently has your company held a tender or similar process 
to select an auditor in the last ten years?     (Please Tick) 
Every year  
Once every two years  
Once every three years  
Once every four years  
Once every five years  
Less often  
Don’t know  
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Q4 What are the 3 most important factors influencing your company’s choice of 
auditor?        (Please Rate) 
Auditor is one of the Big Four accounting firms  
Technical accounting skill  
Quality of staff  
Reputation  
Sector-specific expertise  
International coverage  
Management preference for specific auditor  
Long-term relationship with current auditor  
Reputation of audit firm with investors  
Reputation of audit firm with corporate broker  
Reputation of audit firm with other external advisers (please name)  
Other (please specify)  
 
 
Q5 On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is essential and 5 is irrelevant, how do you rate these 
factors?            (Please Rate) 
Auditor is one of the Big Four accounting firms  
Technical accounting skill  
Quality of staff  
Reputation  
Sector-specific expertise  
International coverage  
Management preference for specific auditor  
Long-term relationship with current auditor  
Reputation of audit firm with investors  
Reputation of audit firm with corporate broker  
Reputation of audit firm with other external advisers (please name)  
Other (please specify)  
 
 
Q6 Does your company have a policy of changing auditors after a set period (e.g., 3 
or 5 years)?        (Please Tick) 
Yes, ................ number of years  
No  














Q7 How likely is it that any of the following scenarios would lead you to consider 
changing your company’s current auditor? 
(Please Rate, were 1 is very likely and 5 is very unlikely) 
A breakdown in the working relationship between auditor and management  
A fault with the quality of the audit opinion  
A disagreement with the auditor over the interpretation of accounting 
standards 
 
A substantial increase in the audit fee (e.g., 15% or above)  





Q8 How significant are the following factors in discouraging you from changing your 
company’s auditor?      
 (Please Rate, where 1 is very significant and 5 is not at all significant) 
Management time required  
Audit committee time required  
A new assessment of your company’s internal controls required  
Possible negative signal to shareholders of changing auditor  
Company would have to change the supplier of related services such as 




Q9 How important are the views of the following stakeholders when choosing an 
auditor? (Please Rate, where 1 is very important, 5 not at all important) 
Finance director  
Chief executive  
Chairman  
Major shareholders  
Credit rating agencies  
Your company’s lawyers  
Your company’s corporate broker  


















Q10 For each of the following firms, please indicate how well you feel you know 
each one? (Please Rate, were 5 is know very well and 1 is never heard of) 
PricewaterhouseCoopers  
KPMG  
Deloitte & Touche  
Ernst & Young  
BDO Simpson Xavier  
Grant Thornton  
Mazars  
Farrell Grant Sparks  
Horwath Bastow Charleton  
Russell Brennan Keane  
Oliver Freaney  
HLB Nathans   
RSM Robson Rhodes  
OSK  
UHY O’Connor Leddy Holmes  
JPA Brenson Lawlor  
PKF Ryan Glennon  
Ormsby & Rhodes  
Moores Stephens Caplin Meehan  
Baker Tilly O’Hare  
 
 
Q11 Thinking about all of the accounting firms you say that you have heard of, which 
would you consider to be reasonable substitutes for your current auditor, 
notwithstanding potential conflicts of interest?   (Please Tick) 
PricewaterhouseCoopers  
KPMG  
Deloitte & Touche  
Ernst & Young  
BDO Simpson Xavier  
Grant Thornton  
Mazars  
Farrell Grant Sparks  
Horwath Bastow Charleton  
Russell Brennan Keane  
Oliver Freaney  
HLB Nathans   
RSM Robson Rhodes  
OSK  
UHY O’Connor Leddy Holmes  
JPA Brenson Lawlor  
PKF Ryan Glennon  
Ormsby & Rhodes  
Moores Stephens Caplin Meehan  
Baker Tilly O’Hare  
Other (please specify)  
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Q12 How many of the firms you mentioned just now are effectively conflicted out 
from providing audit services to your company?   (Please Tick) 








Q13 How likely are you to consider a non Big Four accounting firm for your 
company’s audit?       (Please Tick) 
Very likely  
Fairly likely  
Neither likely nor unlikely  
Fairly unlikely  
Very unlikely  
Don’t know  
 
 
[If you answer ‘neither likely nor unlikely’, ‘fairly unlikely’, or ‘very unlikely’ at Q13 
please answer the next few questions. Others please go to Q16.] 
 
 
Q14 For what reason(s) would you not consider a non Big Four accounting firm for 
your company’s audit? 
 
Shortcomings of the non Big Four firms in terms of…  (Please Tick) 
Technical skill  
Knowledge of the relevant industry  
Reputation or name recognition of the accounting firm  
Credibility with relevant stakeholders in the event of an audit problem  
Price  
International coverage  
Ability to work with the company’s management  











Q15 Approximately what size of reduction in the audit fee would persuade you to 
consider a non Big Four accounting firm for your company’s audit?  (Please 
Tick) 







More than 70%  
............... %  
I would not consider a mid-tier firm at any price  
 
 
Q16 Outside of the Big Four firms, which accounting firms do you think are 
technically capable of providing your company’s audit?  (Please Tick) 
BDO Simpson Xavier  
Grant Thornton  
Mazars  
Farrell Grant Sparks  
Horwath Bastow Charleton  
Russell Brennan Keane  
Oliver Freaney  
HLB Nathans   
RSM Robson Rhodes  
OSK  
UHY O’Connor Leddy Holmes  
JPA Brenson Lawlor  
PKF Ryan Glennon  
Ormsby & Rhodes  
Moores Stephens Caplin Meehan  
Baker Tilly O’Hare   
Other (please specify)  
None  
Don’t know  
 
 
Q17 Do you think there would be any significant differences in the quality of the 
audit provided by non Big Four firms compared with the Big Four? (Please Tick) 
Yes, the Big Four are always higher quality  
No, mid-tier firm(s) are of comparable quality  
Other, mid-tier firms can be of higher quality  







Q18 How likely would you be to consider a non Big Four accounting firm if your 
company’s audit firm went out of business?    (Please Tick) 
Very likely  
Fairly likely  
Not very likely  
Not at all likely  
Don’t know  
 
 
Q19 For each of the following statements, please indicate how important you think 
each factor or development is in making non Big Four accounting firms a realistic 
alternative to a Big Four firm for the provision of audit services to your company? 
(Please Rate, were 1 is very important and 5 is not at all important) 
A mid-tier firm with:  
– technical auditing ability equivalent to a Big Four firm  
– international coverage equivalent to a Big Four firm  
– reputation among major shareholders equivalent to a Big Four firm  
– reputation among company advisers (such as the corporate broker) 




Q20 Which of the following hypothetical audit firms would represent a serious 
alternative to a Big Four firm for your company’s audit?   (Please Tick) 
A firm formed from a merger of several mid-tier firms to create an 
accounting firm of comparable size to the Big Four 
 
A well-established financial services company with a new auditing 
subsidiary 
 
A new entrant to the auditing market engaged purely in audit, with ex-Big 
Four staff 
 




Q21 Which of the following factors would effectively exclude an accounting firm 
other than your current auditor from providing audit services to your company? 
(Please Tick) 
  
It already provides consulting services to my company  
It already provides tax advice to my company  
It already provides corporate finance advice to my company  
It already audits one of my company’s main competitors  









Q22 To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: 
 
‘Currently, there is enough choice of alternative auditors in the market for my 
company to choose from.’ 
         (Please Tick) 
Strongly agree  
Tend to agree  
Neither agree nor disagree  
Tend to disagree  
Strongly disagree  
Don’t know  
 









































Summary of results from survey 
 
 
Table C.1 Response rates 
 
 Responses received Percentage of total 
Response received 33 46.5 
Responses not received 38 53.5 
Total sent 71 100.0 
 
 
Table C.2 Position of respondents 


























 Responses received Percentage of total 
CFO 25 75.8 
CEO 2 6.1 
Director 1 3.0 
Company Secretary 2 6.1 
Audit Committee Chair 1 3.0 
Accounts Manager 1 3.0 
Head of Internal Audit 1 3.0 
Total 33 100.0 
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Table C.3 Accountancy firms used in the last twelve months 
Source: Q2 Which accounting firm or firms has your company used for audit and 
other accounting services over the last 12 months?  
 
Note: Respondents answered more than one firm for certain services 




 % % % % 
PricewaterhouseCoopers 23.1 29.8 12.8 20.5 
Deloitte 10.3 8.5 7.7 13.6 
KPMG 28.2 27.7 12.8 4.5 
Ernst & Young 17.9 14.9 2.6 4.5 
BDO Simpson Xavier 5.1 4.3 5.1 4.5 
Grant Thornton 2.6 2.1 2.6 2.3 
Mazars   2.6  
Farrell Grant Sparks    4.5 
Horwath Bastow Charleton 2.6 2.1   
Russell Brennan Keane    2.3 
Oliver Freaney 2.6 2.1   
HLB Nathans      
RSM Robson Rhodes 2.6 2.1   
OSK     
UHY O’Connor Leddy 
Holmes 
    
JPA Brenson Lawlor    2.3 
PKF Ryan Glennon    2.3 
Ormsby & Rhodes     
Moores Stephens Caplin 
Meehan 
    
Baker Tilly O’Hare     
Other (please specify) 5.1 2.1 5.1 2.3 
Don’t know     
No Answer  4.3 48.7 36.4 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
 
Table C.4 Frequency of tendering by companies 
Source: Q3 Approximately how frequently has your company held a tender or similar 
process to select an auditor in the last ten years?   
     
 Responses received Percentage of total 
Once every 3 years 2 6.1 
Once every 4 years 2 6.1 
Once every 5 years 7 21.2 
Less Often 20 60.6 
Don’t Know 2 6.1 
Total 33 100.0 
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Table C.5 Factors influencing the companies’ choice of auditor 
Source: Q4 What are the 3 most important factors influencing your company’s choice 
of auditor? 
 
 Yes No 
 % % 
Auditor is one of the Big 4 accounting firms 51.5 48.5 
Technical accounting skill 36.4 63.6 
Quality of staff 48.5 51.5 
Reputation 36.4 63.6 
Sector-specific expertise 15.2 84.8 
International coverage 21.2 78.8 
Management preference for specific auditor 12.1 87.9 
Long-term relationship with current auditor 36.4 63.6 
Reputation of audit firm with investors 18.2 81.8 
Reputation of audit firm with corporate broker 9.1 90.9 
Reputation of audit firm with other external advisers  0.0 100.00 
Other – price/ fees 6.1 93.9 
 
 
Table C.6 Rating of factors influencing the companies’ choice of auditor 
Source: Q5 On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is essential and 5 is irrelevant, how do you 
rate these factors?      















 % % % % % % 
Auditor is one of the Big 
4 accounting firms 
42.4 21.2 9.1 9.1 3.0 15.2 
Technical accounting 
skill 
60.6 15.2 12.1 6.1 0.0 6.1 
Quality of staff 51.5 42.4 3.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 
Reputation 45.5 27.3 9.1 9.1 0.0 9.1 
Sector-specific expertise 15.2 24.2 39.4 3.0 3.0 15.2 
International coverage 33.3 27.3 12.1 9.1 3.0 15.2 
Management preference 
for specific auditor 
9.1 3.0 30.3 15.2 30.3 12.1 
Long-term relationship 
with current auditor 
9.1 15.2 30.3 18.2 21.2 6.1 
Reputation of audit firm 
with investors 
21.2 39.4 12.1 6.1 9.1 12.1 
 
Reputation of audit firm 
with corporate broker 
12.1 21.2 9.1 18.2 18.2 21.2 
Reputation of audit firm 
with other external 
advisers  
3.0 15.2 15.2 15.2 24.2 27.3 




Table C.7 Policy of changing auditors after a set period of time.  
Source: Q6 Does your company have a policy of changing auditors after a set period 
(e.g., 3 or 5 years)?  
         
 Responses Percentage of total 
No 33 100.0 
 
 
Table C.8 Scenarios to change auditor 
Source: Q7 How likely is it that any of the following scenarios would lead you to 











 % % % % % % 
A breakdown in the 
working relationship 
between auditor and 
management 
60.6 30.3 6.1 3.0 0.0 0.0 
A fault with the quality of 
the audit opinion 
51.5 36.4 6.1 3.0 0.0 3.0 
A disagreement with the 
auditor over the 
interpretation of 
accounting standards 
3.0 21.2 39.4 15.2 18.2 3.0 
A substantial increase in 
the audit fee (e.g., 15% or 
above) 
18.2 21.2 30.3 24.2 6.1 0.0 
Your company’s auditor 
starts auditing one of your 
company’s main 
competitors 


















Table C.9 Factors discouraging change of auditor 
Source: Q8 How significant are the following factors in discouraging you from 




Table C.10 Whose view is important in choosing an auditor 
Source: Q9 How important are the views of the following stakeholders when choosing 















 % % % % % % 
Finance director 66.7 24.2 6.1 3.0 0.0 0.0 
Chief executive 45.5 33.3 18.2 3.0 0.0 0.0 
Chairman 42.4 15.2 33.3 9.1 0.0 0.0 
Major 
shareholders 
15.2 21.2 21.2 27.3 15.2 0.0 
Credit rating 
agencies 
0.0 15.2 18.2 30.3 24.2 12.1 
Your company’s 
lawyers 
0.0 3.0 18.2 24.2 45.5 9.1 
Your company’s 
corporate broker 
6.1 3.0 33.3 27.3 24.2 6.1 















 % % % % % % 
Management 
time required 
33.3 21.2 24.2 12.1 9.1 0.0 
Audit committee 
time required 











18.2 27.3 15.2 21.2 15.2 3.0 
Company would 
have to change 
the supplier of 
related services 
such as tax or 
corporate finance 
3.0 12.1 15.2 39.4 27.3 3.0 
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bankers 
Audit committee 2.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 97.1 
 
Table C.11 How well the respondents know the accountancy firms 
Source: Q10 For each of the following firms, please indicate how well you feel you 
know each one?  
















 % % % % % % 
PricewaterhouseCoopers 0.0 0.0 12.1 21.2 66.7 0.0 
KPMG 3.0 3.0 21.2 12.1 60.6 0.0 
Deloitte & Touche 0.0 12.1 24.2 21.2 36.4 6.1 
Ernst & Young 0.0 3.0 15.2 27.3 45.5 9.1 
BDO Simpson Xavier 0.0 27.3 24.2 21.2 18.2 9.1 
Grant Thornton 0.0 42.4 18.2 21.2 9.1 9.1 
Mazars 3.0 48.5 18.2 18.2 3.0 9.1 
Farrell Grant Sparks 15.2 36.4 18.2 18.2 0.0 12.1 
Horwath Bastow Charleton 18.2 39.4 18.2 9.1 3.0 12.1 
Russell Brennan Keane 42.4 36.4 0.0 3.0 6.1 12.1 
Oliver Freaney 12.1 57.6 9.1 6.1 3.0 12.1 
HLB Nathans  45.5 33.3 3.0 3.0 6.1 9.1 
RSM Robson Rhodes 30.3 45.5 3.0 6.1 3.0 12.1 
OSK 48.5 27.3 6.1 3.0 3.0 12.1 
UHY O’Connor Leddy 
Holmes 
45.5 30.3 3.0 3.0 3.0 15.1 
JPA Brenson Lawlor 68.8 9.4 3.1 3.1 3.1 12.5 
PKF Ryan Glennon 51.5 24.2 9.1 3.0 3.0 9.1 
Ormsby & Rhodes 45.5 36.4 3.0 3.0 3.0 9.1 
Moores Stephens Caplin 
Meehan 
42.4 33.3 6.1 6.1 0.0 12.1 


















Table C.12 Reasonable substitutes 
Source: Q11 Thinking about all of the accounting firms you say that you have heard 
of, which would you consider to be reasonable substitutes for your current auditor, 
notwithstanding potential conflicts of interest? 
 
 Yes No 
 % % 
PricewaterhouseCoopers 75.8 24.2 
KPMG 57.6 42.4 
Deloitte & Touche 75.8 24.2 
Ernst & Young 63.6 36.4 
BDO Simpson Xavier 24.2 75.8 
Grant Thornton 18.2 81.8 
Mazars 18.2 81.8 
Farrell Grant Sparks 0.0 100.0 
Horwath Bastow Charleton 3.0 97.0 
Russell Brennan Keane 3.0 97.0 
Oliver Freaney 0.0 100.0 
HLB Nathans  0.0 100.0 
RSM Robson Rhodes 0.0 100.0 
OSK 0.0 100.0 
UHY O’Connor Leddy Holmes 0.0 100.0 
JPA Brenson Lawlor 0.0 100.0 
PKF Ryan Glennon 0.0 100.0 
Ormsby & Rhodes 0.0 100.0 
Moores Stephens Caplin Meehan 0.0 100.0 
Baker Tilly O’Hare 0.0 100.0 
 
 
Table C.13 Firms conflicted out from providing audit services 
Source: Q12 How many of the firms you mentioned just now are effectively 
conflicted out from providing audit services to your company? 
 
 Responses Percentage of total 
Three 2 6.1 
Two 2 6.1 
One 5 15.2 
None 24 72.7 












Table C.14 Likelihood of considering a non Big Four firm 
Source: Q13 How likely are you to consider a non Big Four accounting firm for your 
company’s audit? 
 
Very likely Likely Neither Unlikely Very unlikely Don’t know 
% % % % % % 
12.1 18.2 3.0 21.2 42.4 3.0 
 
 
Table C.15 Reasons why companies will not use non Big Four firms 
Source: Q14 For what reason(s) would you not consider a non Big Four accounting 
firm for your company’s audit? 
 
 Yes No No 
answer 
 % % % 
Technical skill 30.3 42.4 27.3 
Knowledge of the relevant industry 24.2 48.5 27.3 
Reputation or name recognition of the accounting firm 48.5 24.2 27.3 
Credibility with relevant stakeholders in the event of an audit 
problem 
54.5 18.2 27.3 
Price 3.0 69.7 27.3 
International coverage 36.4 36.4 27.3 
Ability to work with the company’s management 3.0 69.7 27.3 
Other (please specify) 0.0 72.7 27.3 
 
 
Table C.16 Size of fee reduction to persuade you to consider a non Big Four firm. 
Source: Q15 Approximately what size of reduction in the audit fee would persuade 
you to consider a non Big Four accounting firm for your company’s audit?   
 
11-20% 21-30% 31-40% 51-60% Would not consider 
at any price 
No answer 
% % % % % % 
















Table C.17 Firms technically capable of the companies’ audit 
Source: Q16 Outside of the Big Four firms, which accounting firms do you think are 
technically capable of providing your company’s audit? 
 
 Yes No 
 % % 
BDO Simpson Xavier 63.6 36.4 
Grant Thornton 54.5 45.5 
Mazars 33.3 66.7 
Farrell Grant Sparks 27.3 72.7 
Horwath Bastow Charleton 21.2 78.8 
Russell Brennan Keane 3.0 97.0 
Oliver Freaney 3.0 97.0 
HLB Nathans  0.0 100.0 
RSM Robson Rhodes 6.1 93.9 
OSK 0.0 100.0 
UHY O’Connor Leddy Holmes 0.0 100.0 
JPA Brenson Lawlor 0.0 100.0 
PKF Ryan Glennon 0.0 100.0 
Ormsby & Rhodes 0.0 100.0 
Moores Stephens Caplin Meehan 0.0 100.0 
Baker Tilly O’Hare  6.1 93.9 
Other (please specify) 0.0 100.0 
None 12.1 87.9 
Don’t know 21.2 78.8 
 
Table C.18 Differences in the quality of the audit provided by the non Big Four 
firms 
Source: Q17 Do you think there would be any significant differences in the quality of 
the audit provided by non Big Four firms compared with the Big Four? 
   
 Responses received Percentage of total 
Yes, the big 4 are always 
higher quality 
14 42.4 
No, mid tier firms are of 
comparable quality 
13 39.4 
Other, mid tier firms can be of 
higher quality 
1 3.0 
Don’t know 5 15.2 








Table C.19 Likely to consider a non Big Four firm if your audit firm went out of 
business 
Source: Q18 How likely would you be to consider a non Big Four accounting firm if 
your company’s audit firm went out of business?  
     
 Responses Received Percentage of total 
Very likely 1 3.0 
Fairly likely 9 27.3 
Not very likely 10 30.3 
Not at all likely 12 36.4 
No answer 1 3.0 
Total 33 100.0 
 
 
Table C.20 Rating of how important each factor or development is in making 
non Big Four accounting firms a realistic alternative to a Big Four firm for the 
provision of audit services to the company 
Source: Q19 For each of the following statements, please indicate how important you 
think each factor or development is in making non Big Four accounting firms a 
















 % % % % % % 
A mid-tier firm 
with: 
      
– technical 
auditing ability 
equivalent to a 
Big Four firm 
69.7 24.2 3.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 
– international 
coverage 
equivalent to a 
Big Four firm 




equivalent to a 
Big Four firm 
48.5 30.3 9.1 6.1 0.0 6.1 
– reputation 
among company 
advisers (such as 
the corporate 
broker) 
equivalent to a 
Big Four firm 
18.2 36.4 21.2 12.1 3.0 9.1 
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Table C.21 Serious alternative to a Big Four firm 
Source: Q20 Which of the following hypothetical audit firms would represent a 




Table C.22 Factors that would exclude an accounting firm other than your 
current auditor from providing audit services to your company 
Source: Q21 Which of the following factors would effectively exclude an accounting 
firm other than your current auditor from providing audit services to your company? 
 
 Respondents Percentage of total 
It already provides consulting services to my 
company 
4 12.1 
It already provides tax advices to my company 1 3.0 
It already audits one of my company’s main 
competitors’ 
5 15.2 
None of these 22 66.7 
No Answer 1 3.0 
Total 33 100.0 
 
 
Table C.23 Choice in the market 
 
Q22 To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: 
 
‘Currently, there is enough choice of alternative auditors in the market for my 
company to choose from.’ 
 
 Respondents Percentage of total 
Strongly agree 5 15.2 
Tend to agree 12 36.4 
Neither agree nor disagree 3 9.1 
Tend to disagree 12 36.4 
Strongly disagree 1 3.0 
Total 33 100.0 
 
 
 Yes No 
 % % 
A firm formed from a merger of several mid-tier firms to create 
an accounting firm of comparable size to the Big Four 
72.7 27.3 
A well-established financial services company with a new 
auditing subsidiary 
3.0 97.0 
A new entrant to the auditing market engaged purely in audit, 
with ex-Big Four staff 
24.2 75.8 
Other (please specify) 0.0 100.0 




Transcript from interview with mid-tier firm 
 
1. What are the main barriers to entry for the non-Big Four firms? 
I suppose really there you are talking about lack of experience, in that historically 
there would not have been involved in that market and also that has let to a perception 
that anyone else outside the Big Four could not possibly handle a listed audit. But I 
think thankfully that this is becoming less and less as time goes on.   
 
2. Do you think that investors really influence the choice of auditors or are they 
used as a scapegoat by the companies for justification of their choice of 
auditor? 
I would imagine that really individual investors other than institutional investors have 
limited enough influence. 
 
3. To what extent are audits selected on the advice of advisors for audit services 
in your opinion? 
I would say that advisors probably have a role to play in terms of selection of 
auditors, but purely it is based on reputation rather than insistence by anyone. 
Advisors have some influence. 
 
4. What does your firm do in order to influence corporate advisors (e.g. 
lawyers, bankers) to use your services instead of the Big Four? 
I suppose there is our marketing effort there, we are continually in contact with all of 
them in terms of our existing client base and it gives us the opportunity to see our own 
capabilities first hand, so often that is the best win for us.   
 
5. Do you think that there are misconceptions about the differences between the 
Big Four and mid tier firms? 
Absolutely, yes. I think certainly in the past those misconceptions had some basis. But 
I think going forward a lot of the mid-tier firms are just as well capable of handling 
anything that any Big Four can. 
 
6. How do you think these misconceptions could be overcome? 
I guess it is going to be a slow burner, I think it is just going to take time. It may take 
one or two of the larger Public Limited Companies to move away from the Big Four 
and all of a sudden I think this will probably open up the market. Now I think there is 
probably a need as well for the mid-tier firms to, for example BDO I know are quite 
good at putting themselves out there and making their capabilities known, they 
definitely can be proactive on that, rather than necessarily just waiting on something 
to happen.  It will take time none the less. 
 
7. What alternatives could there be to the Big Four for audit services in your 
opinion for listed companies? 
I guess the alternatives are the mid-tier firms and any of those outside the Big Four, 
any firm I would imagine that has any kind of influence on audit in the top fifteen 





8. Do you think that the present unlimited auditors’ liability regime hinders 
auditors in trying to gain bigger clients? 
Absolutely, yes.  I think that is probably one of the bigger barriers as well going back 
to your first question there in the terms of risk.  The risk for a mid-tier firm in the top 
fifteen would maybe have annual fees of ten or twelve million something in that 
region.  They would find it is a huge risk to take on one client of that size that could 
probably bring down a whole practice and a whole life times work.  So certainly in 
terms of the risk profile it might just be too much for one smaller firm to bear and 
especially if that is not necessarily a world wide firm.  As these listed companies tend 
to be the bigger type audits and so therefore there are restrictions on the amount of fee 
income you can get from any one client. Obviously if you are taking on one of these 
and if you are outside the Big Four you are not going to have the same level of fee 
income.  The Institute of Chartered Accountants requirements are a barrier but they 
are driven by independence. 
 
9. Do you think that the very limited professional indemnity insurance hinders 
auditors in trying to gain bigger clients? 
Absolutely for the same reasons as in eight above. 
 
10. Do you think that the government is doing enough already to increase choice 
in the audit market in the Republic of Ireland? 
No, I am not aware that are doing anything at the moment. 
 
11. What do you think the government could do in the future to increase choice 
in the audit market? 
Maybe the government could support rotation of auditors, perhaps by legislation 
saying you need to rotate your auditor every five years.  At least companies are then 
changing auditors every five years so it will force them as least to look for 
alternatives, and this might draw them outside the Big Four box as part of that 
process.  Certainly there would be disadvantages but in terms of the question, rotation 
would certainly help in bringing the smaller firms more into play.  It does none the 
less give rise to problems and would likely lead to increased audit costs. 
 
12. Do you think that non-Big Four firms would have a better chance of market 
entry if there were only a Big Three? 
That is an interesting question but probably not though. 
 
13. Who would fund the expansion of mid tier firms? 
I suppose they would likely be self-financing, a lot of the growth tends to be organic 
based on the back of previous growth.  I suppose the owners would fund that.  You 
expect that the mid-tier firms with the young, hungrier partner profile are more likely 
to enter that market rather than ones that maybe are not. I think that in that groove of 
between the top four and the top twenty firms you will probably see a lot of change.  
In that unless firms have a fairly young partner profile they are more likely to stagnant 







14. Do you think that non-Big Four firms would consider merging to act as 
competition to the Big Four? 
Absolutely, and many have already.  I think if you look at what is going on in the 
industry at the moment there is a huge amount of consolidation.  I think the mid-tier 
firms have started to merge, as there is a realisation that there is a need to do this.  If 
you look at the accountancy journals you will see the number of firms that are 
merging now maybe they are outside the top twenty but as a merged entity all of a 
sudden they are within the top twenty and that is probably showing an appetite that if 
they have merged once they will probably do it again.  
 
15. What do you think the problems would be in trying to merge the non-Big 
Four firms? 
The core value and the style of that firm.  A lot of the mid-tier firms are around a long 
time and they have there own way of doing things and their own approach to things.  
No different to some of the mergers that you see in the Big Four there recently. There 
are going to be differences in approach, difference in style, differences in personality 
even that will make it difficult.  Some firms are set in their ways. 
 
16. Do the mid-tier firms really want to compete with the Big Four? 
I think they do. I think they would like their presence on the Consultancy side and 
their ability to attract new business on the Consultancy side.  Audit has become so 
specialised now that there may not be the same appetite for audit. The non-audit 
services are more profitable and audit is not a profitable business. 
 
17. Who would be your target clients that are already audited by the Big Four? 
Probably some of the privately owned larger companies would certainly be a target.  
We and a lot of other firms would be very well placed, to service those clients. 
 
18. Does your firm do any marketing to attract new clients (i.e. companies listed 
on the Irish Stock Exchange) for audit services, and if so what type, and does 
it work for your firm? 
Not specifically listed on the Irish Stock Exchange. 
 
19. Does your firm do any marketing for the audit services of subsidiaries of U.S. 
firms? 
Limited.  Generally the subsidiary company auditor is the same as the parent company 
auditor for the bigger companies; the Irish subsidiary tends to be part of the 
worldwide audit.  But certainly with some of the smaller ones that may be the non 
listed U.S. ones, they may not necessarily have a Big Four accountancy firm in the 
U.S. which probably would suggest that they may not have any allegiances to any one 
here in Ireland. 
 
20. Different auditors can be used for group audit and subsidiary audits.  What 
is your view on the proposed 8
th
 company law directive that ‘group auditors 
would take responsibility for an audit’? 
They probably do to a certain extent anyway, in that the numbers get consolidated up 
at group level and it is the parent auditor that signs off on those, so they probably do 




21. Is this your personal view or is this the view of your firm? 
Personal. 
 
22. Do you think that there is enough choice in the audit market for companies 
listed on the Irish Stock Exchange at present? 
I do not think there is actually and certainly the perception is that there is not within 
any contact that we have had with listed companies so I think if the perception is no 


















































Q1 Can you tell me which accounting firm or firms your company has used for 
audit and other accounting services over the last 12 months? 
[Prompt for audit, tax advice, corporate finance, consulting/advisory. Tick as 
appropriate.] 
 





ry (e.g., IT 
Consultancy) 
PricewaterhouseCoopers     
Deloitte     
KPMG     
Ernst & Young     
Grant Thornton     
BDO     
Baker Tilly     
Smith & Williamson     
PKF     
Tenon Group     
RSM Robson Rhodes     
Moore Stephens     
Mazars     
Other (please specify)     
Don’t know     
Refused     
 
 
Q2 Approximately how frequently has your company held a tender or similar 
process to select an auditor in the last ten years? [Read out and code. Single code 
only.] 
 
– Every year 
– Once every two years 
– Once every three years 
– Once every four years 
– Once every five years 
– Less often 









DETERMINANTS OF THE CHOICE OF AUDITOR 
 
Q3 What are the three most important factors influencing your company’s 
choice of auditor? [Unprompted. Multicode up to three.] 
 
– Auditor is one of the Big Four accounting firms 
– Technical accounting skill 
– Sector-specific expertise 
– International coverage 
– Management preference for specific auditor 
– Long-term relationship with current auditor 
– Reputation of audit firm with investors 
– Reputation of audit firm with corporate broker 
– Reputation of audit firm with other external advisers (please name) 
– Other (please specify) 
 
Q4 On a scale of 1 to 5, where 5 is essential and 1 is irrelevant, how do you rate 
these three factors?  And how would you rate the following additional factors? 
[Read out the three items mentioned at Q3, followed by the remaining factors. 
Ask respondent to rate on a scale of 1–5.] 
 
Auditor is one of the Big Four accounting firms 
Technical accounting skill 
Sector-specific expertise 
International coverage 
Management preference for specific auditor 
Long-term relationship with current auditor 
Reputation of audit firm with investors 
Reputation of audit firm with corporate broker 
Reputation of audit firm with other external advisers (please name) 
Other (please specify) 
 
Q5 Does your company have a policy of changing auditors after a set period (e.g., 
3 or 5 years)? 
 
– Yes, ................ number of years 
– No 
– Don’t know 
 
Q6 How likely is it that any of the following scenarios would lead you to consider 
changing your company’s current auditor? 
[Read out. Rotate start. Single code only for each statement. Scale: very likely, 
fairly likely, neither likely nor unlikely, fairly unlikely, very unlikely, and don’t 
know. ] 
 
– A breakdown in the working relationship between auditor and management 
– A fault with the quality of the audit opinion 
– A disagreement with the auditor over the interpretation of accounting standards 
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– A substantial increase in the audit fee (e.g., 15% or above) 
– Your company’s auditor starts auditing one of your company’s main competitors 
 
Q7 How significant are the following factors in discouraging you from changing 
your company’s auditor? 
[Read out all items and rate on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is not at all significant 
and 5 is very significant.] 
 
– Management time required 
– Audit committee time required 
– A new assessment of your company’s internal controls required 
– Possible negative signal to shareholders of changing auditor 
– Company would have to change the supplier of related services such as tax or 
corporate finance 
 
Q8 How important are the views of the following stakeholders when choosing an 
auditor? 
[Rate on a scale of 1–5, where 5 is very important, 1 not at all important. Single 
code for each stakeholder.] 
 
– Finance director 
– Chief executive 
– Chairman 
– Major shareholders 
– Credit rating agencies 
– Your company’s lawyers 
– Your company’s corporate broker 
– Your company’s bankers 
 
Competition between accounting firms in audit services 
‘Audit firms are commonly divided into the Big Four firms (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
Deloitte, KPMG, Ernst & Young) and mid-tier firms such as Grant Thornton, BDO 
Stoy Hayward, and Baker Tilly.  The following questions are about the dimensions of 
your choice between a Big Four firm and a mid-tier firm.’  [Ask all.] 
 
Q9 For each of the following firms I read out, please tell me how well you feel 
you know each one.  [Single code only for each company. Read out and rotate 
start. Scale: know very well/know a fair amount/know a little/heard of but know 





– Ernst & Young 
– Grant Thornton 
– BDO 
– Baker Tilly 
– Smith & Williamson 
– PKF 
– Tenon Group 
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– RSM Robson Rhodes 




Q10 Thinking about all of the accounting firms you say that you have heard of, 
which would you consider to be reasonable substitutes for your current auditor, 
notwithstanding potential conflicts of interest?  [Unprompted, please tick off 





– Ernst & Young 
– Grant Thornton 
– BDO 
– Baker Tilly 
– Smith & Williamson 
– PKF 
– Tenon Group 
– RSM Robson Rhodes 
– Moore Stephens 
– Mazars 
– Other (please specify) 
– Don’t know 
– Refused 
 
Q11 How many of the firms you mentioned just now are effectively conflicted out 
from providing audit services to your company? 
 







Q12 How likely are you to consider a mid-tier accounting firm for your 
company’s audit? 
 
– Very likely 
– Fairly likely 
– Neither likely nor unlikely 
– Fairly unlikely 
– Very unlikely 
– Don’t know 
 
[Ask all who are ‘neither likely nor unlikely’, ‘fairly unlikely’, or ‘very unlikely’ at 
Q12. Others go to Q15.] 
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Q13 For what reason(s) would you not consider a mid-tier accounting firm for 
your company’s audit?  [Unprompted.] 
 
Shortcomings of the mid-tier firms in terms of… 
– technical skill 
– knowledge of the relevant industry 
– reputation or name recognition of the accounting firm 
– credibility with relevant stakeholders in the event of an audit problem 
– price 
– international coverage 
– ability to work with the company’s management 
– other (please specify) 
 
Q14 Approximately what size of reduction in the audit fee would persuade you to 
consider a mid-tier accounting firm for your company’s audit?  [Prompted.] 
 







– More than 70% 
............... % 
– I would not consider a mid-tier firm at any price 
[Ask all.] 
 
Q15 Outside of the Big Four firms, which accounting firms do you think are 
technically capable of providing your company’s audit? 
 
– Grant Thornton 
– BDO 
– Baker Tilly 
– Smith & Williamson 
– PKF 
– Tenon Group 
– RSM Robson Rhodes 
– Moore Stephens 
– Mazars 
– Other (please specify) 
– None 
– Don’t know 
[Ask all.] 
 
Q16 Do you think there would be any significant differences in the quality of the 
audit provided by mid tier firms compared with the Big Four?  [Prompt, read 
out.] 
 
– Yes, the Big Four are always higher quality 
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– No, mid-tier firm(s) are of comparable quality 
– Other, mid-tier firms can be of higher quality 




[Ask all who code A–D at Q1.] 
 
Q17 How likely would you be to consider a mid-tier accounting firm if: 
[Prompt for options A and B] 
 
(A) your company’s audit firm went out of business 
(B) another Big Four firm went out of business 
 
– Very likely 
– Fairly likely 
– Not very likely 
– Not at all likely 
– Don’t know 
 
Q18 For each of the following statements I read out, please tell me how 
important you think each factor or development is in making mid-tier 
accounting firms a realistic alternative to a Big Four firm for the provision of 
audit services to your company? 
[Read out each statement. Scale: very important, fairly important, not very 
important, not at all important, don’t know.] 
 
A mid-tier firm with… 
– technical auditing ability equivalent to a Big Four firm 
– international coverage equivalent to a Big Four firm 
– reputation among major shareholders equivalent to a Big Four firm 
– reputation among company advisers (such as the corporate broker) equivalent to a 
Big Four firm 
 
Q19 Which of the following hypothetical audit firms would represent a serious 
alternative to a Big Four firm for your company’s audit? [Prompted.] 
 
– A firm formed from a merger of several mid-tier firms to create an accounting firm 
of comparable size to the Big Four 
– A well-established financial services company with a new auditing subsidiary 
– A new entrant to the auditing market engaged purely in audit, with ex-Big Four staff 
– Other (please specify) 
– None 
 
Q20 Which of the following factors would effectively exclude an accounting firm 
other than your current auditor from providing audit services to your company? 
 
– It already provides consulting services to my company 
– It already provides tax advice to my company 
– It already provides corporate finance advice to my company 
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– It already audits one of my company’s main competitors 
– None of these 
 
Q21 To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: 
 
‘Currently, there is enough choice of alternative auditors in the market for my 
company to choose from.’ 
 
– Strongly agree 
– Tend to agree 
– Neither agree nor disagree 
– Tend to disagree 
– Strongly disagree 








































Top 20 accountancy firms by fee income in Ireland 
 
Firm Fee Income 
in Ireland 
Belong to International Group 
 
PricewaterhouseCoopers €181m PricewaterhouseCoopers 
KPMG €176m KPMG International 
Deloitte & Touche €114m Deloitte & Touche 
Ernst & Young €110m Ernst & Young 
BDO Simpson Xavier €54m BDO International 
Grant Thornton €21m Grant Thornton International 
Mazars €16m Mazars International Association 
Farrell Grant Sparks €15m Moores Rowland International 
Horwath Bastow Charleton €11m Horwath International 
Russell Brennan Keane €11m Kreston International and               
Leading Edge Alliance 
Oliver Freaney €8m Nexia International 
HLB Nathans  €7m HLB International 
RSM Robson Rhodes €5m RSM International 
OSK €5m CPA Associates International 
UHY O’Connor Leddy Holmes €5m UHY International 
JPA Brenson Lawlor €5m JPA International 
PKF Ryan Glennon €5m PKF International 
Ormsby & Rhodes €5m BKR International 
Moores Stephens Caplin Meehan €4m Moores Stephens International 
Baker Tilly O’Hare €4m Baker Tilly International 
 
 























Companies listed on the Irish Stock Exchange 
 
1. Abbey Plc 
2. Aer Lingus Group Plc 
3. AGI Therapeutics Plc 
4. Allied Irish Banks Plc 
5. Amarin Corporation Plc 
6. Aminex Plc 
7. Anglo Irish Bank Corporation Plc 
8. Anglo Irish Capital Funding Ltd 
9. Ardent Group Plc 
10. Bank of Ireland Plc 
11. Blackrock International Land Plc 
12. CRH Plc 
13. C&C Group Plc 
14. Calyx Group Plc 
15. CPL Resources Plc 
16. Datalex Plc 
17. DCC Plc 
18. Diageo Plc 
19. Donegal Creameries Plc 
20. Dragon Oil Plc 
21. Élan Corporation Plc 
22. FBD Holdings Plc 
23. Fyfee Plc 
24. Gartmore Irish Growth Fund Plc 
25. Getmobile Europe Plc 
26. Glanbia Plc 
27. Glencar Mining Plc 
28. Grafton Group Plc 
29. Greencore Group Plc 
30. Horizon Technology Group Plc 
31. IAWS Group Plc 
32. ICON Plc 
33. IFG Group Plc 
34. Independent News and Media Plc 
35. Iona Technologies Plc 
36. Irish Continental Group Plc 
37. Irish Life and Permanent Plc 
38. ISEQ Exchange Traded Fund Plc 
39. Kenmare Resources Plc 
40. Kerry Group Plc 
41. Kingspan Plc 
42. Lapp Plats Plc 
43. McInerney Holdings Plc 
44. Minmet Plc 
45. Mosney Irish Holidays Plc 




Companies listed on the Irish Stock Exchange continued… 
 
47. Norkom Group Plc 
48. Oakhill Group Plc 
49. Oglesby & Butler Plc 
50. Ormonde Mining Plc 
51. Ovoca Gold Plc 
52. Paddy Power Plc 
53. Petroceltic International Plc 
54. Petroneft Resources Plc 
55. Providence Resources Plc 
56. Qualceram Shires Plc 
57. Readymix Plc 
58. Real Estate Opportunities Ltd 
59. Ryanair Holdings Plc 
60. Siteserv Plc 
61. South Wharf Plc 
62. Tesco Plc 
63. Thirdforce Plc 
64. Trinity Biotech Plc 
65. Tullow Oil Plc 
66. United Drug Plc 
67. UTV Plc 
68. Veris Plc 
69. Viridian Group Plc 
70. Vislink Plc 

























List of abbreviations 
 
 
• APB  Auditing Practices Board      (UK/Ire) 
• AQF  Audit Quality Forum       (UK) 
• CLRG Company Law Review Group    (Ireland) 
• CGAA  Coordinating Group on Audit and Accounting  (UK) 
• FRC   Financial Reporting Council      (UK) 
• GAO  General Accounting Office     (USA) 
• IAASA   Irish Auditing and Accounting Supervisory Authority (Ireland) 
• ICAI   Institute of Chartered Accountants in Ireland   (Ireland) 
• ICGN  International Corporate Governance Network    
• IFSC International Financial Services Centre   (Ireland) 
• ISE   Irish Stock Exchange      (Ireland) 
• OFT  Office of Fair Trading      (UK) 
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